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19 January 1978

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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1496

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

MARITIME AGREEMENT WITH USSR, CSSR--An agreement on principles governing cooperation in maritime transport up to 1980 between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union has been signed in Moscow. It has been signed by Frantisek Mares, first deputy minister of foreign trade of the CSSR, and Vladimir Tikhonov, first deputy minister of the maritime fleet of the USSR. [Text] [Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0030 GMT 21 Dec 77 LD]

SOVIET, CZECHOSLOVAK COOPERATION--Nikolay Rodionov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, and Frantisek Krajcir, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the CSSR, have had talks in Moscow on Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation and some topical international problems. The consultations which took place in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, have also been attended by Jan Havelka, the Czechoslovak ambassador. [Text] [Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 1000 GMT 21 Dec 77 LD]

CZECHOSLOVAK, HUNGARY COOPERATION--The 17th session of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian working committee for culture and education ended in Budapest yesterday. It discussed improving the qualifications of teachers at primary and secondary schools and exchanging experiences and cooperation in cinematography. The final protocol at the session was signed by the heads of the two delegations, Zdenek Trhlik, deputy foreign minister, for Czechoslovakia, and for Hungary Janos Gosztoni, under secretary of state at the Ministry of Education. [Text] [Prague Domestic Service in Czech and Slovak 0100 GMT 23 Dec 77 LD]

CSO: 2400

ALBANIA

CREATION OF MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY IN IRAN REPORTED

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 8 Dec 77 p 4

[ATA report: "The Communist Party of Workers and Peasants in Iran Is Established"]

[Text] The Iranian newspaper TUFAN, in its October issue, published a communique of the Central Committee announcing the holding of the first Congress and the creation of the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants in Iran. The communique says that after 14 years of unceasing struggle, the Iranian Marxist-Leninists grouped together around the organ TUFAN, under the conditions of terror and oppression of the reactionary regime in Iran, held the first founding Congress of the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants in Iran, in complete illegality.

The Congress, according to the communique and other material published by the newspaper, is a great victory, an event of historic importance for the further development, with resolute enthusiasm and determination, of the revolutionary struggle of the working class, of the peasant, and of all workers in the country. It formulated the political line for the party organizations and assigned to the Iranian communists the obligation of fighting for the people's democratic revolution. The Congress expressed the fidelity of the Iranian communists to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and their determination to fight US imperialism and Soviet social imperialism, modern revisionism and the opportunistic three worlds theory, and fierce reaction in the country.

The congress sent a message of greetings to the Albanian Workers Party, which expressed solidarity for the AWP, led by Comrade Enver Hoxha, and highly praised the struggle of the AWP against new and old revisionism, for the protection of the purity of Marxism-Leninism.

CSO: 2100

CZECHOSLOVAK DISSIDENT EVALUATES OCTOBER REVOLUTION

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 5/6 Nov 77 p 5

[Article by Dr Zdenek Mlynar: "The October Revolution Reaches Retirement Age--What Has Remained of the Slogans of the Bolshevik Fighters 60 Years Later?"]

[Text] The celebrations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution are culminating in Moscow this weekend. What has remained of the heritage of the old Bolshevik fighters, however? A new industrial society has been built in the Soviet Union without the aid of private capital, and all landownership has been eliminated; but, in place of the small capitalists, an all-powerful state has established itself, which cares nothing about political freedom and which is concerned only about the aura of a superpower, about its role in the world. And the self-determination of people proclaimed by the revolutionaries at the time of the revolution is only an empty phrase today. The author of today's article, university lecturer for general political theory and former secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, knows what he is talking about: he was present at the confrontation with the "new czars" in the Kremlin in 1968.

Celebrations of a 60th Anniversary, even for deserving people, are always an occasion for drawing up a balance sheet of the past rather than a starting point for the future. There looms a thought which can only be drowned out by the celebrations but cannot be eradicated: retirement is knocking at the door.

The huge official propaganda machine which is organizing the celebrations of the 60th Anniversary of the October Revolution in the Eastern bloc is trying to convince the world that in this case everything is the other way round. But the world is witnessing the fact that this revolution has not found satisfactory solutions for the present and future problems. Today,

too, it is a matter of the past and while the critical balance sheet of its results is important for the present and for the future, this is not the case as far as the sum total of those solemn phrases is concerned which actually are not even believed any more by those who have originated them.

The greatest influence on the workers' movement in Europe and the world was exercised by the October Revolution at a time when it appeared that it was accomplishing the impossible. The workers' movement attached to it a great socialist dream--the radical elimination of all obstacles in the way of social justice but also of political freedom, the transfer of factories into the hands of the workers, and of the land to the peasants, the elimination of pressure on national minorities and the security of a life without war.

If it was possible to realize this program in Russia--such a backward and miserable country--why should it not be possible to do so elsewhere? Many thought that it was a question of method: as long as the method does not involve breaking the power of capital through armed revolt, it has to then be replaced by the workers' movement with the Bolshevik method of preparing for such a revolt.

The people who spread the glory and the political influence of the October Revolution in the world were not by any means "realists" of the kind loved and protected by the Politburo in Moscow today. They revolutionary dreamers, political "radicals," extremists. And the workers, insofar as they stood behind them, supported them because of these very qualities, for they had enough of reality as it existed at the end of World War I.

Then came one of the great historical paradoxes. While outside the borders of the Soviet Union the communist radicals split the workers movement in the name of the October Revolution and in disgust at the compromises with bourgeois reality, in Russia itself the heirs of October capitulated before the semifeudal reality of their backward country and concluded a fundamental compromise with it. The revolution in the West, however, which the Bolsheviks originally had considered a sine qua non of their success, did not occur. And so Stalin simply began building "socialism in one country." The new state began to industrialize the backward agrarian country. While it did so without private capital, it had to subject itself to all laws of the accumulation of capital, with the government bureaucracy assuming the job of manager.

The Birth of Totalitarian Dictatorship

Pushed into utter economic isolation by the policy of the bourgeois countries, Soviet power took the means of industrialization from the one and only place where it was possible to do so--the countryside. Rapid and forcible collectivization was the means, and misery and famine were the result. All conflicts which arose from this situation were nipped in the bud by Soviet power. Gradually it eliminated any possibility of expression, suppressed political freedom and democracy. From this then sprang a totalitarian dictatorship supported by the bureaucracy, a huge police apparatus and concentration camps for hundreds of thousands and later millions.

In practice the procedure was, in fact, very effective. Industrial production grew, new towns emerged, and the people connected with this industrial growth lived a better material and cultural life than the Russian muzhiks had done under the czars. The successes also triggered enthusiasm among the people--the Stakhanovites of the Soviet five-year plans have been just as real as the hell which is called Gulag. An industrial society without private capitalists was born, but with an all-powerful state. The political power now allots everything to the people on the basis of its own decisions, and then takes it away from them again--economic plans and work assignments, wage rates, social welfare and public health aid, modest political organizations, ideas, arts and sciences.

In the process, political power enjoys maximum independence from the people's opinion, with the people having hardly any opportunity to express their wishes. The state has only to ensure that its decisions are not opposed by massive concentrated resistance by the majority of the population. It must therefore satisfy the normal material and cultural needs of the average member of society--i.e., needs which to this day are at a very low level in the Soviet Union. In addition to the bureaucracy, the police and the military, the totalitarian regime is supported to a significant extent by the very satisfaction of the average citizen with his primitive demands and his conservative mentality.

While such a society was coming into existence in the Soviet Union, the communists in Europe, under Stalin's direction, fought against the social democrats, in the name of the inadmissibility of "class peace" with bourgeois democracy. This contributed in a considerable extent to the fact that the years of the capitalist economic crisis resulted in the victory not of socialism but of fascism.

Bureaucracy in Moscow Experiments

For the supporters of the idea of the October Revolution in the world, the halo of the victors over fascism for some time concealed again the contours of the Stalinist order. Not until 1956 was the curtain lifted, by Khrushchev. The retinue of the October Revolution throughout the world got to see a piece of the reality--and were thunderstruck. For a time it appeared as if the political power in the Soviet alone would seriously correct the reality--i.e., also in the spirit of the original ideals of the October Revolution. But when the Soviet bureaucracy realized that such experiments would do it more harm than good, and when later Brezhnev lowered the curtain again, it was already too late.

In those countries there are no Soviet armies stationed, on the eve of the October celebrations things will not be limited to uttering noncritical, glorifying phrases even on the left. Yugoslavia and China have refused for years to recognize the Soviet model of social order as an example for socialism. The Italian Communists are arguing with the Socialists in their country about whether Soviet society is a socialist society with antidemocratic features (as the Communists maintain) or an antidemocratic totalitarian society with socialist features (as the Socialists maintain). The

The leader of the Spanish Communist Party compares the position of Moscow in the communist movement to the situation of Rome before the Reformation.

There is little that the socialists and social democrats can add to the characteristics which originate with the communists. The workers' movement, which split fratricidally 60 years ago under the influence of the October Revolution, slowly and with difficulty, under the influence of the actual results of the revolution, is seeking a way to a new unity. And above all, it realizes that it cannot be a desirable program to copy anything which resulted from the revolution in Russia. The extremists radical leftwing of this movement--once the pillar of "Bolshevization"--now either is oriented toward China or is, in fact, guided by its own interpretation of Marxism, but definitely not by Brezhnev's.

The paradox of the whole development is completed by the Politburo in Moscow when, in this situation, it establishes as the main argument for its own socialism the thesis that it is exclusively this socialism which "really exists." The offspring of the Bolsheviks, who gained their influence in the workers' movement because something that did not exist was no obstacle in the way of the revolution for them, today shout to their critics: "Why do you want something else? After all, we are the force which exists in reality!"

In August 1968, when I sat with Dubcek and others in the Kremlin after the military intervention in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev tried to make clear to us the utter hopelessness of our situation by saying: "What do you think is happening to your advantage? Nothing. There will not be war as a result.... Comrade Tito will speak, followed by Comrade Berlinguer. What else? You are counting on the communist movement in Western Europe--but this has not been of any significance at all for 50 years." I think this makes it clear what the situation is concerning the October Revolution on the eve of its 60th anniversary. Brezhnev is convinced that the communists in West Europe will not have any tanks, military or any other police for another half century. But he has them. So who is the "real socialist" here--he or the others?

The great influence of the October Revolution in Europe and the world 60 years ago did not just result from the fact it proclaimed socialist objectives. Everyone could see the defeat of the czarist empire, that prison of peoples. But the Bolsheviks promised to implement the principle of the self-determination and sovereignty of all people. The new power of Soviets issued the "Decree Concerning Peace," predicting a future without wars, aggressions or annexations of small states by stronger ones. At the end of World War I these were slogans in which the simple people of all nations placed their hopes; they were postulates which were bound to sound as the music of paradise to the people in the colonies.

Today however, after 60 years, one can find only in a few remote corners of this earth political forces which consider Moscow to be the protector of national sovereignty. The decisive forces of this Third World, let alone Europe, have long since ceased to have such ideas.

All Soviet constitutions, up to the latest by Brezhnev, have all along contained firm provisions protecting the right of all peoples of the Soviet Union to self-determination, including the right to leave the federation. But from the very beginning of the Soviet republic, a word uttered out loud to the effect that the centralist union might perhaps not be the fulfillment of the national dreams of one or the other people was stamped as an utterance of "bourgeois nationalism" and therefore as counterrevolutionary activity. Anyone holding such opinions to this day goes off to prison, to Siberia, to an insane asylum. It is therefore without difficulties that one constitution can take over from another the right of the self-determination of people.

After World War II, Stalin made up for what the October Revolution originally had spoiled, from the point of view of the big-power interests of the Russian empire. A piece of Finland, all Baltic states, eastern Poland, parts of Romania and of Czechoslovakia directly joined the "fraternal family of Soviet peoples." East and central European countries on whose territory the Red Army was stationed at the end of the war (with the exception of Yugoslavia and Austria) were annexed to this "family" through a somewhat freer but nevertheless firm rope. Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, however much they may differ from one another, they regard in impressive agreement this "socialist world system" as the model of a new, higher type of international relations, which supposedly guarantees not only fraternal cooperation but the freedom and sovereignty of all peoples.

The example of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 suffices to illustrate reality. The Soviet military police units arrested and dragged off the speaker of the parliament, the prime minister, the head of the party and other members of the Communist Party leadership. The Soviet ambassador personally attempted to form a new government--of course, a "revolutionary worker and peasant government." Only after this failed did the prisoners become "delegates" and the "negotiations" in the Kremlin began.

Brezhnev told his Czech hostages at that time: "Today it seems impossible to you to accept all this, but look at Gomulka. In 1956, he was opposed, as you are, to our military coming to Poland's aid. But if I said today that our troops were being withdrawn from Poland, Gomulka would board a special plane to fly here and beg me not to do that."

In his way, Brezhnev was right. Today he can be sure that Gustav Husak in a similar situation would also come to Moscow in order to ask that his country remain occupied. But at the same time, he can be sure that the people in Czechoslovakia certainly would not ask for this, for in our country, where the people did not live through czarism and where there were therefore no anti-Russian sentiments in 1945, by now every child knows what Russian big-power policy is. And neither Berlinguer nor Marchais will try to crawl under the wings of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet leader may also be sure that now all European people know the worth of his words about "nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries" and about

"not applying force in international relations." And this not only in Europe: in Egypt, India and elsewhere in the world, August of 1968 was a lesson for the politicians, who saw what it meant to rely too much on Moscow as defenders of the freedom and sovereignty of peoples.

Soviet society itself does not need any war. It is a society which strives to attain economic growth, improve the standard of living and solve a whole series of development problems of its own. But all this requires peace. Yet total dictatorship has imbedded itself as a parasite in the body of this society, and this dictatorship is not controlled democratically or otherwise, influenced by society. The representatives of this dictatorship, however, regard it as their vital interest to maintain the Soviet Union as a superpower of this earth. If its position were weakened, it would also have to question at the same time the stability of the totalitarian regime within the Soviet society.

A Superpower--Dependent on the Good Will of the West

To maintain the position of a superpower (in competition with the United States) is an extraordinarily demanding task. For the problem of the Soviet Union is that it is justifying less and less its role as a world power with regard to its economic and political and ideological influence. This necessarily strengthens the tendency of the people in power in the military field. At the same time, the representatives of the totalitarian dictatorship are forced by internal economic and political factors to strive actually--and by no means only pro forma--for a limitation of the economically expensive armament race and to busy themselves with a policy of detente vis-a-vis the whole West. For it is from there that the Soviet Union needs above all to get economic aid and cooperation--among other things, again in order to keep its role as a superpower.

The question which presents itself is whether this policy is leading to a trend toward peace or whether the Chinese criticism is right when it regards this very line as increasing the danger of war. I believe that over and above all this, the internal needs and trends of development in Soviet society (but also in the other countries of the Eastern bloc) are of decisive importance. The policy of detente can lead to peace. However, as long as society in the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet type is unable effectively to influence the people in power, one cannot exclude the serious danger of adventurous decisions by the dictators.

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CSO: 3103

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BRIEFS

CSSR AMBASSADOR TO UN--The secretary general of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, received Czechoslovakia's new permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Ilja Hulinsky, in New York yesterday. Ambassador Hulinsky presented his credentials and his authorization as the Czechoslovak representative in the Security Council to Kurt Waldheim. [Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 0600 GMT 23 Dec 77 LD]

MONGOLIAN CONSTRUCTION DELEGATION--Viliam Kozik, secretary of the Central Trade Union Council, received in Prague today a delegation of Mongolian construction specialists. They were interested in particular in the forms of welfare, safety and protection at work and also in young people's share in the development of society. They also talked about the modernization of industry and the utilization of leisure time by our working people. [Text] [Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1130 GMT 21 Dec 77 LD]

CSO: 2400

EAST GERMANY

'SPECIAL CHARACTER' OF USA-PRC RELATIONS ANALYZED

East Berlin DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK in German Vol 22 No 12, Dec 77 signed to press 3 Nov 77 pp 92-109

[Article by Dr Bernd Kaufmann, Humboldt University, East Berlin: "Current Problems of USA-PRC Relations"]

[Text] A few days after the 11th CCP Congress (12 to 18 August 1977), U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance went on an official visit to the PRC (22 to 26 August), which made him the first foreign government representative to do so. That then has, since the early '70's, brought two U.S. presidents, three secretaries of state, a considerable number of senators and dozens of congressmen to China. There has not yet been any official return visit by any Chinese politician to the United States. Which means that American diplomacy, normally placing the greatest importance on the "reciprocity" principle when dealing with socialist states, does not worry too much about that principle when dealing with the PRC. One must add that official U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations still do not exist. Both states develop their relations via "contact offices" established in 1973 in Washington and Peking. The United States, furthermore, maintains unlimited diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level with the Taiwan regime. That is tantamount to a "Two-China Policy." Yet the representatives of both countries have been reiterating, indefatigably, for years that the Shanghai communique agreed upon as long ago as 1972 between former U.S. President Nixon and the PRC's late Prime Minister Chou En-lai presents the formal basis for developing political relations and at the same time forms the political and legal framework for--as one calls it--the full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations.

Even these few facts demonstrate that U.S.-PRC relations are of a special character and are therefore not comparable with relations normally engaged in between states with differing social orders. The unique quality of the Chinese-American relationship lies in the desire of both states to push back, or weaken, the influence and radiating strength of world socialism, especially of its main political, military and economic force, the Soviet Union, which is probably the crucial basis for the current development of those relations. This explains the place the PRC occupies within U.S. global foreign policy strategy in general, in the worldwide struggle against socialism, as well as

within the framework of the detente process in American-Soviet relations initiated in the early '70's, in particular. Here one can find, as it were, the place value and function the Chinese leadership has assigned to the United States, principally for its big power policy against the Soviet Union.

In his important foreign policy speech on 22 May 1977, President Carter outlined the China policy of his administration as follows: "We consider the American-Chinese relationship a central element of our global policy, and China the most important force for global peace. We want to work closely together with the creative Chinese people in those problems with which all mankind is confronted. We hope to find a formula by which to bridge some difficulties that still divide us."¹

Li Hsien-nien, the vice chairman of the CCP Central Committee, in July this year told the former U.S. chief of naval operations, Admiral Zumwalt, a staunch opponent of detente, China and the United States should "have to undertake joint efforts in dealing with the polar bear (Author: Which means the Soviet Union.)," and the United States should have to give up its "pacification policy" vis-a-vis the USSR, and China would possibly become willing to accept American arms shipments.² At the 11th CCP Congress, Central Committee Chairman Hua Kuo-feng made the point that "the relations between the two countries could be improved," provided the principles of the Shanghai communique were met.³

Debates about the basic objective and the concrete shaping and speed of the development in the relations between both states have been going on for years in the United States as well as in the PRC leadership. Thus far it has not mainly been a matter of their normalization and of the development of interstate relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. But that would certainly have been a natural thing. Normal interstate relations between such countries as the PRC and the United States, not directed against third states, and hence against other peoples, could well serve the cause of peace and international security. Yet what has been and still is the central issue in the current U.S.-PRC relations is how the political, economic and military weight, and the international position and influence of the PRC could be used by the United States (or, vice versa, those of the United States by the PRC) in regional and global areas of world politics in order to broaden one's own leeway of political action, mainly in opposition to the Soviet Union and world socialism, and to enforce any given objectives in power politics and the interests of the partner.⁴

On this basis the political rapprochement has been taking place between the leading imperialist power, the United States, and the PRC, especially since the end of the '60's and the early '70's. And the only restraint on the American-Chinese relationship, the still unresolved Taiwan issue, that is, the political and military U.S. ties with Taiwan, has kept formal diplomatic relations from being established.

Developmental Tendencies of American-Chinese Relations

When the Shanghai communique had established official political relations with the PRC and contact offices had been set up, the United States was talking euphorically of the start of a "new dimension" in American foreign policy. The then President Nixon after his visit to China in February 1972 even ventured the claim his one-week stay in China had "changed the world." Because of the results reached in American-Chinese relations from 1971 till early 1974, they came to think in the United States that a "new age had dawned." As William J. Barnds, a leading associate of the influential New York "Council on Foreign Relations," soberly commented on it, they had been confusing "the reduction of hostile attitudes (Author: Between the United States and the PRC.) with establishing cooperative relations, a matter that takes much more time and remains uncertain in its results."⁵

A basic premise for the political U.S.-PRC rapprochement brought about in important issues in international relations has been the Chinese leaders' big power policy with its mostly antisoviet orientation. The primary goal of the American China policy no doubt has been (and is) to develop with the PRC a network of political and economic relations, and possibly also of long-range militarily and strategically relevant relations, that will more closely tie the PRC to the United States, without at the same time abandoning the Taiwan regime, the longtime and most devoted Asian ally of the United States. The China policy of the United States continues to be oriented to deliberately using the PRC for exercising pressure on the Soviet Union, principally within the framework of the complicated political and military detente process going on in American-Soviet relations. That is the extent to which in Washington one has understood (and understands) the China policy, primarily as an instrument for influencing the relations the United States has to the Soviet Union.

They let themselves be guided, in the United States, by the notion that the development of relations with the PRC and a rapprochement between the two states on an antisoviet basis would automatically help stop the change going on in the international balance of power in favor of world socialism so that lost positions in international relations could be regained. American policy furthermore also aimed at finding an effective machinery for influencing the Chinese government in its foreign policy dealings with the USSR, whereby to preserve the tense Chinese-Soviet relationship, and also with respect to extant or potential international conflict situations, as in Korea, the Middle East and South Africa. Thereby--as the United States meant to do--the PRC was to be more effectively included as a structural element in the system of the "balance" of powers, as stipulated by the United States, for the shoring up of global imperialist interests. At the same time they sought to confine the big power claim by the Chinese leadership to Asia. Thus the new "Pacific Doctrine" that former President Ford announced late in 1975 offered the PRC a partnership in creating a new kind of "power balance" in the East Asian-Pacific area.⁶ The premise for that was that the Chinese leadership would support demonstratively the preservation of a military U.S. presence in the Asian-Pacific area, especially the so-called security treaty between the United States and Japan, and a reinforcement of the Japanese military potential as a "counterweight" against the Soviet Union.

As it turned out in recent years, especially since the middle of 1974, the American-Chinese relationship came under the influence of weighty international factors and domestic policy processes in the United States and the PRC. They brought a significant element of instability into those still unfirm relations and defined the objective limits of their collusion. A significant role was played here by the concrete course of the development of Soviet-American relations, especially the conclusion of important accords, the matters of strategic arms limitation among them. Taking account of the international balance of power as between socialism and imperialism, the U.S. administrations under Nixon and Ford found themselves induced to assign unrestrained priority to their policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Proceeding from there, both administrations, for all intents and purposes, maintained a balanced relationship with the USSR and the PRC. Their endeavor was not to allow the Chinese leaders to impose upon them the direction of U.S. foreign policy--especially with regard to the Soviet Union. One of the results of that was that Ford's trip to Peiking in December 1975 led to no tangible results and could merely suggest some sort of symbolic development in American-Chinese relations.

The extremely militant antisoviet and anti-detente manner of the Chinese leadership began to obstruct the development of bilateral relations. More realistic U.S. circles found that they were not able, when proceeding from the overall U.S. interest, to make further concessions by ignoring the extreme antisovietism of the Chinese leaders and their militant hostility to detente. M. Oksenberg, President Carter's current China advisor in the NSC, stated in March 1976 before a hearing at the Future Foreign Policy Research and Development Subcommittee, of the International Relations Committee, that to be sure, a "common strategic interest" of the United States and the PRC in confining the international influence of the USSR had helped bring Washington and Peking closer together. "The subsequent unwillingness or disinclination by the United States to oppose Soviet intentions" then however had induced the Chinese leadership "to place a long-term usefulness of a liaison with the United States in doubt."⁷

Other reasons for the factual stagnation in American-Chinese relations can be found in that, from the Chinese point of view, the United States has failed to live up to its obligations contained in the Shanghai communique, to reduce its political and military presence on Taiwan. Furthermore, the U.S. government had failed to authorize the export of a number of commodities that were of military importance. From the American point of view, China's military moves in the South China Sea (1974) and its continuing military aid to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had not been regarded as a contribution to the reduction of tension that would have been necessary for further reducing the U.S. military presence on Taiwan in accordance with the Shanghai communique.⁸

The military and political victory of the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia created an atmosphere of instability and uncertainty for U.S. East and Southeast Asian policy which made the U.S. government afraid that a reduction of its liaison with the Taiwan regime under those conditions could be read

by American allies as a signal that the United States would withdraw further from Asia and thus would jeopardize the presence of U.S. imperialism in that region. Numerous American politicians opposed further compromise in the Taiwan issue. The Chinese leadership understood that and discontinued its open pressure on the United States so it would take steps to loosen its relations with Taiwan. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing announced that China had "no time schedule for the solution of the Taiwan question."⁹

The slowdown of the development of American-Chinese relations since 1974 also is to a large extent to be attributed to the sharp domestic crisis of the leadership both in the United States and in the PRC. The Watergate scandal around Nixon and the 1976 election campaign limited the foreign policy action radius for former President Ford in the China issue, while in Peking the struggle for the succession to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, within the framework of the "campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius," assumed extreme forms and at times exposed the proponents of developing the U.S. relations to the risk of being called "capitulators." The death of Chou En-lai and the power conflict within the Chinese leadership, which in April 1976 led to the temporary removal of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, shook the confidence in China's ability to be or to become any kind of serious U.S. ally. Those who advocated an accelerated development in relations with the PRC would draw the conclusion from the power policy shifts in the Chinese leadership that one should have to provide foreign policy support for the pragmatic forces favoring the idea of China's rapprochement with the United States, for they might otherwise opt for a relaxation of relations with the USSR. Even China hands in the CIA spoke up, recommending a normalization of relations with the PRC as long as Mao Tse-tung was still alive as imperative. They evidently believed they could thereby avoid all the difficulties and risks possibly emerging with Mao's succession.¹⁰ And then there also came that unexpected release, along with what was an apology, of a Soviet helicopter crew on 27 December 1975, held in China for almost 2 years on the pretext of espionage, which was read in the United States as a sign of a less hostile and more compromising attitude by the Chinese leadership toward the USSR in the future.

U.S. opinion polls in 1975 and 1976 indicated the China euphoria had visibly disappeared. Most Americans, to be sure, advocated full diplomatic relations with the PRC but at the same time opposed breaking off the political ties with Taiwan. In the U.S. Congress, exercising a stronger influence on the President's foreign policy decisions since the Watergate scandal, a constellation of forces emerged which for the time being gives preference to maintaining the status quo in the U.S. China policy, that is to maintaining political relations with the PRC as well as with the Taiwan regime, or makes the reduction of ties with Taiwan, for the benefit of diplomatic relations with the PRC, dependent on the Chinese leadership's declaration that it will refrain from using any force against Taiwan in the future.

Discussions About the Future U.S. China Policy

The contradictory development in American-Chinese relations sparked an intensive discussion during the final phase of the Ford administration and in the election campaign about the China policy of the new administration. This debate about normalizing relations with the PRC for all intents and purposes was a debate between the more realistic forces and the conservative-reactionary wing of American politics. Though it had been demonstrated that antisovietism, as shared by the American and the Chinese leadership, was not automatically a tenable basis for permanent relations, the question as to how China could best be played out against the Soviet Union once again played a crucial role. One no doubt recalled the words Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing had used when speaking with Ford in December 1975 that it was "an important point in common" in the Shanghai communique "that neither of the two states sought hegemony and each would oppose desires by any other country, or group of countries, to establish any such hegemony."¹¹ Teng's prominent reference to this "anti-hegemony clause" directed against the Soviet Union confirmed the U.S. leadership in its view that antisovietism would remain that which connects the United States with the PRC, and the Taiwan issue and other problems of interstate relations would remain subordinate to it. This was precisely the direction in which a comprehensive catalog of measures was pitched that ranged from establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC all the way to strengthening the Chinese military potential by large-scale sales of American arms and important military technological transfers, submitted in the fall of 1976, as a proposal, to the new administration, for shaping its China policy by the influential conservative Sinologist J. A. Cohen. Along those lines, Cohen wrote, among other things: "The United States should be perfectly aware that a normalization (Author: Of relations with the PRC.) would put pressure on Moscow to behave more cautiously, if not more cooperatively, toward the United States. It would assure China's leaders that the United States could serve as a counterweight against the USSR, whereby it also probably would reduce the prospects and scope of a possible Chinese-Soviet reconciliation that would have extremely unfavorable effects on the positions of the United States and of its friends in world politics."¹²

Cohen's idea actually was nothing new. Since 1975 it has been shown that mainly also the representatives of the military-industrial complex in the United States, who are hostile to international detente, peaceful coexistence, the initiation of further disarmament and arms limitation measures and the development of relations with the Soviet Union, are seeking an acceleration in the relationship with the PRC. With their anti-peace and anti-detente policy they feel downright attracted and spurred on by the Chinese leaders in playing the Chinese game. They seek to plot with Peking against the Soviet Union. Furthermore these circles could and can point out that the Chinese have repeatedly shown interest in purchasing American arms, military equipment and military technologies, or in having military commodities included in their commercial relations.¹³

In the American view, Peking had hoped as early as in 1973 that the United States would couple its detente policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union with a willingness to supply the PRC with American weapons.¹⁴ Talks with unofficial American travelers in China and press articles, in the American reading of it, had suggested the interest of certain groups within the Chinese leadership in U.S. military technology.¹⁵ Moreover, China had started to buy more and more weapons from West European countries, with American approval, or to import militarily relevant technologies as, for instance, Rolls Royce jet engines from Britain.¹⁶ Evidently on the initiative from the Pentagon therefore, discussions had been initiated in 1975 about the possibility and usefulness of military-strategic ties with the PRC.¹⁷ The argument was that the level of military-strategic cooperation with the PRC or the initiation of measures strengthening the Chinese military potential should have to be made dependent on the Soviet Union's attitude toward national liberation movements (as in Angola) or toward international conflict situations and sources of tension. This idea was based on the proposition that by tending toward military-strategic cooperation, one could expect the Chinese leadership to show a greater willingness for compromise in the Taiwan issue, possibly even the willingness to assume an obligation for a peaceful solution of the problem after the United States had withdrawn from Taiwan, which would more rapidly bring about the establishing of diplomatic relations with the PRC while still maintaining Taiwan as an ally of the United States.

Domestic developments in the PRC, especially the temporary setback to the pragmatic forces in the leadership which--in the American view--were interested in certain military-strategic ties with the United States, for the time being put that issue onto the back burner. The Chinese themselves no longer expressed any interest, in April 1976, in getting American weapons, equipment or appropriate technologies to a congressional delegation made up primarily of armaments experts.¹⁸ Then for a while there also came out press articles warning China against becoming dependent on imperialist states as it had been in the 19th century. In the United States itself, no general release was issued on arms export or militarily significant technology transfers. The sending of some militarily relevant commodities--like computers, aircraft, helicopters and so forth--were governed by special authorization procedures.

New impetus was given to the matter when the former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger visited China in the fall of 1976. Coming home, he advocated one should not reject possibly strengthening the Chinese military potential.¹⁹ Mao Tse-tung's death in September 1976 and the power struggle following it, which led to the elimination of the so-called gang of four, made the U.S. government react. It reiterated its willingness to establish diplomatic relations soon, held out the prospect of support for China in case of an external threat, and released militarily relevant computer technology for export. By this, one hoped to support those forces within the Chinese leadership which were regarded as pragmatic and as holding a positive view on a political rapprochement with Western countries, especially the United States. And of special importance in all this was that certain U.S. circles would not exclude the possibility that sooner or later Mao Tse-tung's death might lead

to some relaxation and gradual improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations because Mao had turned the hostility to the Soviet Union into a characteristic feature of PRC foreign policy and, together with Chou En-lai, through planning the armed border conflicts with the USSR in 1969, initiated the so-called opening to the West directly.²⁰ Already in November 1975, the position was taken in hearings at the House of Representatives that a possible relaxation in the Soviet-Chinese relationship after Mao Tse-tung's death would run counter to American interests.

The Dilemma of the American China Policy

Former Secretary of State Kissinger made the point at a press conference late in October 1976 that a "threat" against the "territorial integrity and sovereignty" of the PRC by an "external power," a "war between the Soviet Union and the PRC," would be regarded as a "serious matter" by the United States. In such a case one could no longer preclude a shipment of military equipment.²² That remark substantially implies a possible U.S. willingness to assume a military assistance obligation to the PRC. It was clearly aimed at reinforcing the Chinese leaders in continuing their antisoviet and anti-peace policy with U.S. support. A "policy at the edge of war" between China and the Soviet Union, certain U.S. circles believed, would best enforce U.S. interests in opposition to the Soviet Union and the PRC. It could tie the USSR down in terms of foreign and defense policy, move the PRC closer to the United States, and allow China to be more purposefully used against the USSR. For making the big power political ambitions of the Chinese leaders prevail this means, however, that their maneuverability would bound to be restricted for a long time and China surely would become somewhat dependent on imperialism.

There is an obvious miscalculation in this conception, which is derived from the "balance" of power doctrine advocated by Kissinger late in 1976 and still held by some others even today. The miscalculation is that, first of all, it contains the wrong notion about the development of the international power ratio and, secondly, is based on a tactical foreign policy approach by Peking which the Chinese leadership had been forced to modify as early as in the mid-'70's. Its policy vis-a-vis the United States no longer proceeded, as it had done in the early '70's, mainly from the position that China would become the object and main target of a presumed Soviet "surprise attack." The Chinese leadership had made a tactical revision in assessing the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and that between China and those two states.²³ At the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 it had been announced that the United States and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, were engaged in a "common cause" and that they, on the other hand, were "in rivalry" with each other in order to "divide the world anew, and to fight" against China.²⁴ But at the 10th Party Congress in 1973 it was stated that the United States and the USSR were engaged in a "common cause" and, at the same time, were "in competition," and their "rivalry" was "absolute and protracted," with Europe holding a "key position" in it, while their cooperation was "relative" and "temporary." The Soviet Union was said to be engaged in a "deception maneuver in the East in order to attack the West." China would have to be

prepared "in particular for a surprise attack" from the Soviet Union.²⁵ Further modifications were undertaken in the first session of the Fourth National People's Congress of the PRC in 1975. While the thesis of the "surprise attack" by the USSR on China was left out, Chou En-lai declared that the United States and the USSR were "the source of another world war" and that "their raging contest one day would inevitably lead to a world war." They maintained the contention there that Europe was the "focal point" and that the Soviet Union was "engaged in deception maneuvers in the East" while "attacking the West."²⁶

The Chinese leadership had posed as a "victim" of an alleged Soviet threat in order to make a political rapprochement to the United States on an anti-soviet basis. It promised itself thereby also certain economic and military services from the United States and other capitalist states that would strengthen China's military-economic potential. Being as vacuous as it was, this role of being a "victim," however, turned out to be no longer tenable for further developing the relations with the imperialist states and for mobilizing those countries against the Soviet Union and world socialism. The successful peace and detente policy of the states of the socialist community restrained the maneuverability of Peking's antisoviet big power policy. The Chinese leaders found themselves more and more isolated internationally. And so they started looking for another basis for their desired "united front" and cooperation with the United States and other capitalist states in the struggle against the Soviet Union. They now allied themselves with the most reactionary and extreme anti-detente forces in the imperialist states and picked up temporarily increasing tendencies in the policies of those countries that came down to stopping the international process of detente and to encumbering, or making impossible, the now requisite military detente. The Chinese leaders took a position on the centers of tension in South Africa and in the Middle East that directly amounted to assisting imperialism. They announced the Soviet Union's main political and military thrust was not primarily directed against China but, above all, in Europe, against the United States.²⁷ This argumentation was presented to all delegations of American politicians who visited China in 1976 and 1977.²⁸ Thus it became a decisive point of departure in the discussion of the issue of a "new" China policy for the Carter administration. And thereby then the attempt was made to have Carter's future China policy take its clues from the Chinese leadership's tactical foreign policy modifications.

Some groups of U.S. Sinologists had long been thinking it was necessary to develop an autonomous China policy that would not primarily be an "appendage" to the policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.²⁹ One also could find the view that relations to the PRC should be based on long term "parallel interests" of both states on a bilateral, regional or global level and should be agreed on over long periods. The point was made that the Soviet Union would continue to play the important role of a "strategic factor" in the U.S. China policy, and relations with China must not be built on a "common enemy" strategy, since that would run the risk of making the American-Chinese relationship dependent on the relations between the Soviet Union and China.³⁰

Other groups, close to the administration, have long been focusing on initiating an "arms control" dialog with the PRC. It was proposed in this connection, for example, to start negotiations for getting an agreement of reciprocity to the effect that neither the United States nor the PRC would be the first to use atomic weapons. As other possible topics to be negotiated they have been considering seeking accords on steps for reducing the danger of an accidental or unauthorized outbreak of nuclear conflict between the two countries and setting up a "hot wire," including China in the nonproliferation treaty on nuclear arms, the establishing of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Korea and other matters.³¹ They are promising themselves from the initiation of a long term dialog on these subjects a stabilization of American-Chinese relations and, above all, an improved American position in the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Since President Carter took office the discussion has been continuing on how to restructure the American China policy. Even though it was reemphasized that establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC was a "strategic and historic inevitability," all one can see up to now are the vaguest outlines for it.³² Carter himself--and evidently supported in this by his security advisor Brzezinski--has from the very start been assuming a cautious, wait-and-see attitude in the matter of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. First there were indeed other topics in foreign policy occupying the main attention of the Carter administration: the relations with the USSR, the Middle East, Africa, the main imperialist allies and other matters. This was criticized by those who regard a speedy establishing of diplomatic relations with the PRC as a central problem of great urgency for U.S. strategy as a whole. Among them is Senator E. Kennedy. He demands that an exchange of ambassadors with Peking should come no later than in 1978, whereas relations with Taiwan were to be maintained merely on a "nonofficial" basis.³³

A group of Sinologists around NSC member M. Oksenberg and around D. Barnett of the influential Brookings Institution would want "resolute steps" vis-a-vis China.³⁴ According to Barnett, "a crucial turning point" had now been reached in the relations with the PRC, and unless concrete results were to be achieved soon, things could become "very much worse."³⁵ In the matter of developing military contacts with the PRC Barnett advises a cautious approach so as not to encumber U.S.-USSR relations too heavily. He therefore rejects for the time being sales of arms and direct military technology transfers from the United States while he emphatically supports continuing arms shipments by West European countries standing in for the United States. With the idea of establishing long term U.S.-PRC military contacts, he suggests the exchange of military attaches.³⁶

In a directive for the Pentagon, President Carter called China a "world power with which international developments ought to be discussed."³⁷ That is a decisive step the Carter administration has taken to restructure its China policy. It reflects the U.S. desire to proceed--on the basis of "parallel strategic interests," as Carter put it before the United Nations on 17 March 1977--from a political collusion with the Chinese leaders to jointly planned and coordinated measures for repressing the influence of real socialism in

Asia, Africa and Latin America. To that goal apparently the establishing of diplomatic relations with the PRC continues to remain subordinated. The basic decision has been made, and the debate about it pertains merely to the time when and the conditions under which this is to take place.³⁸ However, the attempt to continue the "Two China Policy" remains crucial in Carter's policy, a matter which certain U.S. circles, holding it against the concern of the Shanghai communique, regard in a sense as a "backward move."³⁹

The view that with the assumption of diplomatic relations with the PRC Taiwan should at all cost be maintained as an "independent political unit" and U.S. ally has in this context gained significant ground.⁴⁰

The 11th CCP Congress

The political report to the 11th CCP Congress reaffirms the rigorous continuation of the big power policy and, above all, basic antisoviet line of the so-called "proletarian revolutionary foreign policy" of Mao Tse-tung, with the understanding of turning China by 2000 into a dominant world power.⁴¹ More sharply and more pointedly than ever before, the focus is now placed on a total political and ideological confrontation with the USSR and the CPSU, with the Soviet Union being repudiated as still more "dangerous," "aggressive" and "expansionist" than the United States. The USSR is being defamed more bluntly than ever as the main enemy of all peoples and states in the world. The point is made that the "greater danger" for a presumably unavoidable outbreak of war comes from the Soviet Union, it being in the "offensive," strategically, whereas U.S. imperialism is in the "defensive." Europe--as in the past-- is seen as the major point of "rivalry" between the United States and the USSR. Those components, or territories, of world politics like the Soviet peace and security policy, disarmament and strategic arms limitation, Western Europe, the Middle East, South Africa, the Persian Gulf, international waterways and other matters are in fact defined as areas where "parallel interests" with the United States exist insofar as it is there where the confrontation with the Soviet Union is meant to be advanced jointly. Continuing the previous practice of politically differentiating between the main enemy, the Soviet Union, and the subordinate enemy, the United States, the task is given to form the broadest possible "united front" in the struggle against the Soviet Union. The United States is explicitly included as an alliance partner in this "united front." A central role is assigned to the main imperialist power in the big power policy of the new Chinese leadership directed against the Soviet Union and the socialist states allied with it. The "anti-hegemony clause" of the Chinese-American Shanghai communique, with its thrust against the USSR, is being raised in the political report, in obedience to the conception of the Carter administration, from amounting merely to contractually to be negotiated, and parenthetical, "parallel interests" to become the superior connecting link in the relations between the two states. The "anti-hegemony clause," when we come right down to it, now receives the status of the decisive basis for the development of relations with the United States, whereby Peking has signaled its readiness forcibly to coordinate with the United States fundamental issues of world

politics. The price the Chinese leadership is asking the United States to pay for it, however, is abandoning Taiwan. As an absolute condition for the establishing of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States three preparatory acts are demanded of the United States: Withdrawal of the still remaining 1,200 military personnel and removal of all military U.S. installations from Taiwan; severance of U.S. diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and cancellation of the so-called defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan signed in 1954.

The Chinese are rejecting the American demand to repudiate in one form or another, in return, any use of force against Taiwan or to assume an explicit obligation to bring about a future incorporation of Taiwan Province within the national federation of the PRC, and thus the control over Taiwan, through peaceful means only. That U.S. demand is considered interference in domestic Chinese affairs. For the "liberation" of Taiwan is something the PRC defines as an "internal political affair."

The Visit in Peking by U.S. Secretary of State Vance

Against the background of the 11th CCP Congress, the U.S. Secretary of State engaged in an intensive exchange of views with his Chinese colleague Huang Hua about the development of interstate relations as well as world political issues. Vance was received by the Chairman of the CCP Central Committee and Premier Hua Kuo-feng and his deputy Teng Hsiao-p'ing. No joint communique was signed. Vance called his China trip reservedly an "informational visit" with limited objectives. His purpose, however, is likely to have been to sound out the possibilities for establishing diplomatic relations and mainly to become acquainted with the views the Chinese hold on the pertinent American views and, in connection with it, to stake out those areas in world politics where the Americans think "parallel interests" exist between the United States and the PRC.⁴²

This is the context which obviously explains the main concern of the Vance mission to bargain with the new Chinese leadership for a compromise in time that would allow the United States to carry on for the time being with what is its de facto "Two China Policy," in order not to jeopardize, by assuming political relations with the PRC, the long range survival and security of its longtime ally Taiwan. After the Secretary of State had returned to the United States, President Carter clarified that point of view by saying there would be no hurry about establishing diplomatic relations, and the recognition of the PRC would come only with American interests being protected and the obligation being respected that the United States had assumed to a "life in freedom" by the population of Taiwan.⁴³ In return for keeping quiet about this, the PRC leadership was to be given the prospect of closer cooperation in the global struggle against the Soviet Union based on the so-called parallel interests between both sides. The U.S. government concept of Vance's talks in Peking evidently was based on the idea the Chinese leadership would agree to giving preference to a global strategic cooperation with the United States, with its thrust against the USSR, and thus continue to regard the Taiwan issue as secondary, as a PRC-U.S. problem for which there was not short-term solution.

A few days after the U.S. Secretary of State had left Peking, Li Hsien-nien and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, on 30 August and 6 September respectively, presented American journalists with a public analysis of the talks with the U.S. Secretary of State that was unusual for the Chinese.⁴⁴ Teng Hsiao-p'ing said efforts on behalf of normalizing Chinese-American relations had met with a "setback," by which he referred explicitly to the matter of assuming diplomatic relations, but not to the identity of interests between the Chinese leadership and the United States in matters of world politics. The reason for it, according to Teng, was that Vance had departed from the ideas of the former Ford administration on speeding up the normalization of interstate relations on the basis of the three above mentioned Chinese preconditions. Vance had proposed the assumption of full diplomatic relations with the PRC while establishing a contact mission on Taiwan like the one the United States maintains in Peking.

This proposal does indeed amount to maintaining U.S. diplomatic contacts with Taiwan and thus to a continuation of the U.S. "Two China Policy." Teng did not mention the Chinese demand for removing the U.S. military presence and the cancellation of the so-called defense treaty. Teng's move obviously expresses a certain degree of nervousness. He sought to put pressure on the United States so that it, with respect to Taiwan, would pay for the antisoviet line. Although Teng Hsiao-p'ing categorically denied there was any "flexibility" in the PRC's position on Taiwan and rejected the American demand for rendering a declaration repudiating force, as an interference in internal Chinese affairs, he yet admitted that in seeking a solution of the problem, that is, in forming a PRC-Taiwan relationship, "the special conditions on Taiwan would be taken into account." When one comes right down to it, Teng Hsiao-p'ing promised the United States there would be no use of force against Taiwan in the future, provided the United States was ready to establish the diplomatic relations with the PRC in accordance with the three preconditions and withdraw the demand for an official PRC declaration on repudiating force.

Actually, that view had been adumbrated in a JEN MIN JIH PAO lead article back on 11 January 1977, which had been read in the United States at the time as a relevant signal sent to the new administration.⁴⁵ The Chinese government, furthermore, had clearly informed the United States via Japanese channels that it, in its efforts on behalf of a future incorporation of Taiwan, would take "no sudden measures opposing U.S. interests," if the United States were to come to an understanding with China about common action against the USSR and accepted the three Chinese preconditions for establishing diplomatic relations.⁴⁶ That conception also was corroborated in the interview with Li Hsien-nien who in a sense asked the United States to oppose the Soviet Union more vigorously, especially in Europe. He merely deplored that President Carter was unwilling to abandon his "old friend" Taiwan. This statement thus endorses the basic statements of the 11th Party Congress and underscores that the political rapprochement by the Chinese leadership to U.S. imperialism is the predominant trend in the PRC-U.S. relationship. In this sense--this is how matters are seen in the United States.

after Secretary of State Vance's negotiations in Peking--"the Chinese leaders will want to continue their relations with the United States even if Washington refuses to cancel its defense treaty (Author: with Taiwan.)."⁴⁷

The Vance visit in Peking served the purpose of reinforcing the American position in the SALT negotiations which resumed in September. That purpose is not likely to have been achieved. To that extent then the Vance trip--as was already stated on 25 August 1977 in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, even if only with regard to the Panama issue--also was a "wrong mission on the wrong topic at the wrong time." There will doubtless start now another round of discussions on the U.S. China policy. The visit by the U.S. Secretary of State to Peking has however made clearer what the government under President Carter is after. There is, first of all, the wish to proceed from the collusion with the Chinese leaders toward coordinated action on the basis of "common strategic interests" and, secondly, to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC and, third, to preserve Taiwan for the United States. But this also makes clear that the further escalation of antisovietism has not been pushed as far by the United States as the Chinese leaders hoped it would be. The question thus becomes how the PRC leadership will face the United States in the future. The struggle against the Soviet Union no doubt will remain the priority in the Chinese leaders' policy, even as far as their dealing with the United States is concerned. This was made absolutely clear by Foreign Minister Huang Hua in his speech before the 32nd UN General Assembly on 29 September this year. Resorting to the grossest defamation of, and most vicious attacks on, the worldwide peace and detente policy of the Soviet Union, he reinforced the militant and aggressive basic antisoviet course of the Chinese leadership. Whether however on that basis a solution of the Taiwan problem is feasible without further compromises, in the way the Chinese leadership wants it, remains a matter of doubt.

FOOTNOTES

1. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Paris, 30 May 1977.
2. Ibid., 24 August 1977.
3. Hua Kuo-feng, "Political Report to the 11th CCP Congress," NCNA, Peking, 22 August 1977.
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5885

CSO: 2300

EAST GERMANY

DEFENSE MINISTER GREETES NVA SOLDIERS, CIVILIANS ON NEW YEAR

East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 30 Dec 77 p 2 AU

[Text] Berlin (ADN): Army General Heinz Hoffmann, Politburo member of the SED Central Committee, and minister of national defense, addressed the members and civilian personnel of the National People's Army [NVA] and the GDR border guards on the occasion of the New Year.

"1977 was a successful year--for all of us, for socialism and for peace," he declared. The GDR's working people and soldiers have accomplished outstanding achievements, which have made life better, more beautiful and also more secure. Socialism is proving to be the only social system that guarantees happiness and prosperity, security and welfare, freedom and democracy for people." Under the leadership of the party of the working class, side by side with our Soviet comrades in arms and with the other allies, we will continue to do everything in our power to build a happy future of peace, socialism and communism for all people in our country and for the fraternal socialist alliance," the minister stated.

The minister also remarked that with the preparations for the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the GDR a new stage in the implementation of the Ninth SED Congress decisions is beginning. This historical event is a worthy opportunity to continue the competition plan that was started on the occasion of the October Revolution anniversary celebrations. The minister further stated that it is a question of a socialist soldier's honor to devote oneself entirely to the strengthening and protection of the socialist motherland. "We are parting with 1977 in the firm resolve to implement our military class assignment." Minister Hoffmann remarked.

Army Gen Heinz Hoffmann expressed his gratitude to the staff of the people's army, to the border guards and to the civilian army personnel for the exemplary way they have fulfilled their duty and wished them and their families a happy, healthy and successful New Year 1978.

CSO: 2300

EAST GERMANY

LAW, REGULATIONS ON CIVIL DEFENSE, BORDER TROOPS AWARDS PUBLISHED

East Berlin GESETZBLATT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK in German
Part I No 33, 15 Nov 77 pp 357-360

[Text] Decree of 25 October 1977 on Awards of State Decorations for GDR
Civil Defense and GDR Border Troops

Article 1

In recognition and appreciation of outstanding performances and services
as well as for extended loyal performance of duty by members and assisting
and honorary members of civil defense of the German Democratic Republic

- a) the honorary title "Meritorious Worker of Civil Defense of the German Democratic Republic,"
 - b) the "Medal for Loyal Services in the Civil Defense of the German Democratic Republic,"
 - c) the "Medal for Loyal Performance of Duty in the Civil Defense of the German Democratic Republic"
- are established.

Article 2

In recognition and appreciation of special services in the protection of
the state frontier of the German Democratic Republic as well as for extended
faithful performance of duty in the Border Troops of the German Democratic
Republic

- a) the "Medal of Merit of Border Troops of the German Democratic Republic,"
 - b) the "Medal for Loyal Services in the Border Troops of the German Democratic Republic"
- are established.

Article 3

Details of awarding are established by the regulations on awards (annexes
1 to 5).

Article 4

The initial awarding of state decorations in accordance with Article 1 will occur on the occasion of "Civil Defense Day" on 11 February 1978 and of state decorations in accordance with Article 2 on the occasion of the "GDR Border Troops Day" on 1 December 1978.

Article 5

This decree becomes effective upon publication.

Berlin, 25 October 1977

The Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic
W. Stoph
Chairman

Annex 1: Regulation on Award of Honorary Title of 'Meritorious Member of GDR Civil Defense'

Article 1

The honorary title "Meritorious Member of Civil Defense of the German Democratic Republic" (hereinafter: honorary title) may be awarded for outstanding performances, special services and extended exemplary loyal performance of duty in increasing the operational readiness of civil defense of the GDR.

Article 2

- (1) The honorary title is awarded to persons who are active in civil defense within the framework of a service or work relationship or as an additional or honorary duty.
- (2) The honorary title can only be awarded once.

Article 3

- (1) The honorary title includes a medal, a certificate and a premium of 5,000 marks.
- (2) The premiums are financed from the state budget and are to be planned by the Ministry for National Defense.

Article 4

- (1) The Chief of Civil Defense of the GDR is authorized to make nominations.
- (2) The decisions are made by the Minister for National Defense.

Article 5

- (1) The awarding of the honorary title is done by the Minister for National Defense on the occasion of "Civil Defense Day" on 11 February.
- (2) Up to five honorary titles can be awarded yearly.

Article 6

- (1) The medal is round, of goldplated bronze and has a diameter of 35mm. It consists of a body with a raspberry red face. A laurel wreath with two crossed daggers is found on the edge while the GDR state coat of arms is in the middle. The words "For the Protection of Workers' and Peasants' Power" are placed around the coat of arms. On the reverse are the words "Meritorious Member of Civil Defense of the GDR." The medal is attached to a five-cornered clasp covered with white-grey ribbon. Two horizontal and parallel raspberry red stripes of 0.5mm and 2 mm width are woven into both sides of the ribbon. Two connected goldplated laurel branches are set vertically in the middle of the clasp.
- (2) The interim clasp is rectangular and has the arrangement of the medal clasp.

Annex 2: Regulation on Award of 'Medal for Loyal Services in GDR Civil Defense'

Article 1

The "Medal for Loyal Services in the Civil Defense of the German Democratic Republic" (hereinafter: the medal) is awarded for conscientious, extended and loyal performance of duty in building and consolidating the civil defense of the GDR.

Article 2

- (1) The medal is awarded to persons who are active in civil defense within the framework of a service or work relationship.
- (2) The awarding of the medal is in four steps:
 - bronze for 5 years
 - silver for 10 years
 - gold for 15 years
 - gold for 20 yearsof loyal performance of duty for civil defense.
- (3) The medal is awarded in the appropriate highest step for the initial award.

Article 3

A certificate is awarded with the medal.

Article 4

- (1) The awarding of the medal is done by the Minister for National Defense on the day of accomplishment of performance of duty of the times established in Article 2, paragraph 2.
- (2) The presentation of the medal may be delegated.

Article 5

- (1) The medal is round, has a diameter of 35mm and is bronze, silver or gold colored depending on the step. On the obverse is the state flag of the GDR and the banner of the working class with the letters "DDR" below and three oakleaves and an acorn to the left and right of this. The upper portion of the medal is formed by the words "For Loyal Services" and the lower part by the words "Civil Defense." On the medal for 20 years of performance the state flag and the banner of the working class are colored. On the reverse is the GDR state coat of arms surrounded by the words "For the Protection of Workers' and Peasants' Power" and two laurel branches. The medal is attached to a five-cornered clasp covered with a green ribbon. Red-gold-silver horizontal stripes are on both sides of the ribbon. The medal in silver has a silver colored horizontal stripe woven into the middle of the ribbon while the medal in gold has a gold colored stripe. A gold colored XX is also mounted on the clasp of the medal for 20 years of performance of duty.
- (2) The interim clasp is rectangular and has the arrangement of the medal clasp.

Annex 3: Regulation on Award of 'Medal for Loyal Performance of Duty in GDR Civil Defense'

Article 1

The "Medal for Loyal Performance of Duty in the Civil Defense of the German Democratic Republic" (hereinafter: the medal) is awarded for extended, loyal, conscientious and active work for the civil defense of the GDR.

Article 2

- (1) The medal is awarded to persons who are active in civil defense as an additional or honorary duty.
- (2) The award of the medal is in three steps:
 - bronze for 10 years
 - silver for 20 years
 - gold for 30 yearsof loyal performance of duty for civil defense.
- (3) The medal is awarded in the appropriate highest step for the initial award.

Article 3

A certificate is awarded with the medal.

Article 4

- (1) The awarding of the medal is done by the Chief of Civil Defense of the GDR on the occasion of "Civil Defense Day" on 11 February.
- (2) The presentation of the medal may be delegated.

Article 5

- (1) The medal is round, has a diameter of 35mm and is bronze, silver or gold colored depending on the step. In the middle of the obverse is the civil defense emblem. The words "For Loyal Performance of Duty" are stamped around the emblem. On the reverse is the GDR state coat of arms surrounded by the words "For the Protection of Workers' and Peasants' Power" and two laurel branches. The medal is attached to a five-cornered clasp covered with raspberry red ribbon. A colored horizontal stripe denoting the step of the medal is woven into the middle of the ribbon: signal red for bronze, silver colored for silver and gold colored for gold.
- (2) The interim clasp is rectangular. The ribbon corresponds to that of the medal clasp.

Annex 4: Regulation on Award of 'Medal of Merit of GDR Border Troops'

Article 1

The "Medal of Merit of the Border Troops of the German Democratic Republic" (hereinafter: the medal) can be awarded for outstanding services and personal operational readiness in constant reliable securing of the land and sea frontiers of the German Democratic Republic, political and military leadership, education and training of members of the Border Troops of the GDR.

Article 2

- (1) The medal is awarded to:
 - a) members and civilian employees of the Border Troops of the GDR;
 - b) persons who are not members of the Border Troops of the GDR;
 - c) collectives of those named in a) and b).
- (2) The medal is awarded in steps of bronze, silver and gold depending on performances and services.
- (3) The medal can be awarded in its individual steps more than once.

Article 3

The medal includes a certificate and a financial award.

Article 4

The Deputy Minister for National Defense and Chief of the Border Troops of the GDR is authorized to make nominations.

Article 5

- (1) Awarding of the medal is done by the Minister for National Defense on the occasion of "GDR Border Troops Day" on 1 December, on 7 October, on Republic Day and also immediately after performances accomplished.
- (2) The presentation of the medal can be delegated.

Article 6

- (1) The medal is round, has a diameter of 35mm and is of bronze, silverplated or goldplated bronze. The obverse displays a frontier marker in the middle with a symbolically pictured submachine gun surrounded by a stylized laurel wreath. The upper portion of the medal is formed by the words "For Outstanding Services" and the lower portion by the words "Border Troops of the GDR." On the reverse is the GDR state coat of arms surrounded by the words "For the Protection of Workers' and Peasants' Power" and two laurel branches. The medal is attached to a five-cornered clasp covered with red ribbon. A green horizontal stripe is found on both sides of the ribbon. The middle of the ribbon for the medal in silver has a silver colored horizontal stripe while the medal in gold has a gold colored stripe.
- (2) The interim clasp is rectangular. The ribbon corresponds to that of the medal clasp.

Annex 5: Regulation on Award of 'Medal for Loyal Services in GDR Border Troops'

Article 1

The "Medal for Loyal Services in the Border Troops of the German Democratic Republic" (hereinafter: the medal) is awarded for extended, conscientious and loyal performance of duty in the Border Troops of the GDR.

Article 2

- (1) The medal is awarded to members and civilian employees of the GDR.
- (2) The award of the medal is in four steps:
 - bronze for 5 years
 - silver for 10 years
 - gold for 15 years
 - gold for 20 yearsservice in the Border Troops.
- (3) The medal is awarded in the highest appropriate step at the time of initial award.

Article 3

The medal includes a certificate.

Article 4

- (1) The awarding of the medal is done by the Minister of National Defense on the day that the times of service established by Article 2, paragraph 2, are completed.
- (2) The presentation of the medal may be delegated.

Article 5

- (1) The medal is round, has a diameter of 35mm and is bronze, silver or gold colored depending on the step. On the obverse is the state flag of the GDR and the banner of the working class, below this the letters "DDR," left and right of this three oakleaves and an acorn. The upper portion of the medal is formed by the words "For Loyal Services" and the lower part by the words "Border Troops." On the reverse is the GDR state coat of arms surrounded by the words "For the Protection of Workers' and Peasants' Power" and two laurel branches. The state flag and the banner of the working class are colored on the medal for 20 years of service. The medal is attached to a five-cornered clasp covered with a green ribbon. A black-red-gold horizontal stripe is on both sides of the ribbon. The middle of the ribbon of the medal in silver has a silver colored horizontal stripe while the medal in gold has a gold colored stripe. There is also a gold colored XX set on the clasp of the medal for 20 years of service.
- (2) The interim clasp is rectangular and has an arrangement corresponding to that of the medal clasp.

8373

CSO: 2300

EAST GERMANY

BRIEFS

POLITICAL PRESSURE ON TEACHERS--The political and ideological pressure on teachers in the GDR is evidently to be further intensified. At its most recent meeting, the central executive committee of the Instruction and Education Union [a non-industrial member union of the FDGB] ordered all union management personnel in GDR schools to influence teachers more emphatically than before at training courses and during "personal political discussions" in accordance with SED policy and "to develop their socialist convictions." As is indirectly indicated by the union decision, the SED leadership is dissatisfied with the ideological party-line loyalty and the political persuasion work of many pedagogues. If one starts out with the focal points of the indoctrination program which has been agreed upon, then teachers' circles criticize economic development in the GDR, question "the superiority of socialism, its advantages and merits," and neglect the ideological conflict with "imperialism." According to the union, successful training and education work necessitates striving for uniform political concepts in the collective and ensuring the "consistent implementation of mutually acquired standards and viewpoints" by all pedagogues. Moreover, teachers are to be supported in "the development of a correct relationship between criticism and self-criticism" as well as in "the exposition for overcoming antiquated thinking and behavior patterns." [Text] [Bonn IWE-TAGESDIENST in German No 245, 22 Dec 77 p 2]

MEDICAL CARE FOR FOREIGN GUERRILLAS--East Berlin--More than 200 wounded Palestinian and African guerrilla fighters were treated in hospitals in East Germany in 1977, an East German Government official reports. At the same time East Germany sent about R81 million worth of "solidarity goods"--largely medicines and food--to Vietnam, Laos, leftist states in Africa and black nationalist movements.--Sapa-Reuter [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 29 Dec 77 p 5]

CSO: 2020

WARSAW PACT MILITARY SCIENCE CONFERENCE HELD

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 16 Dec 77 pp 1, 5

[Article by M.S.: "On the Further Integration of Scientific Activity in the Armies of the Socialist Community"]

[Excerpts] The fraternal cooperation of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact signatories, including the scientific-research and teaching centers of these armies, is multifaceted. One form of this cooperation was the scientific conference organized on 14-15 December 1977 by the Scientific Group of the Polish Armed Forces General Staff. The theme was titled "Current Problems and Main Trends in the Development of Military Science of the Socialist Countries." The delegations which participated in the conference were from the armed forces of the USSR, the Bulgarian People's Army, the GDR National People's Army, the Hungarian People's Army and representatives of the Polish People's Army. The Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Army Gen Florian Siwicki, chaired the proceedings.

During the conference, which was held at the Karol Swierczewski General Staff Academy, representatives of the fraternal armies delivered several papers.

On the second day of the conference, a review was made of the characteristic traits of military science in the socialist countries, showing its superiority over bourgeois military science. The representative of the GDR National People's Army made a comparison of the characteristics, whereas the Soviet participant discussed the mutual relationship of military science and military doctrine. The theme of the Bulgarian People's Army representative was the theory of warfare as the nucleus of military science while the Czechoslovakian People's Army representative spoke on the role and place of military history in contemporary military science. Theoretical problems were also discussed--armed forces leadership; the training and indoctrination of soldiers; and military economics. The unity of theory and practice, which constitutes the most important requirement of military science development was also pointed out.

Army Gen Florian Siwicki, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Deputy Minister of National Defense, summed up the discussion. He thanked the conference participants for their interesting presentations on the complex problems of military science. He also emphasized that the conference was an important factor in the further integration of scientific activity of socialist community armies.

CSO: 2600

WORK COMPETITION CONFERENCE CALLS FOR MORE EFFORT

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 22 Dec 77 pp 1, 4

[Appeal to all Polish workers, signed by Members of the National Conference of Work Competition]

[Text] To all leading workers and socialist work brigades! To all working people!

Fellow Work Comrades!

The successes which have been achieved by our country during the period of People's Poland are the result of the successful realization of the socio-economic tasks set forth by the Party and of the diligent and productive work of all personnel.

A singular manifestation of productive activity is socialist work competition, which has always been an expression of the working people's political support for our party and for its program for our country's socioeconomic development.

As a result of the realization of obligations, material production has grown, the process of the socialist education of society has progressed, political commitment and the development of appropriate social attitudes have deepened.

In the coming year it will be a matter of undertaking such initiatives as will conduce to an increase in the saving of resources, raw materials, fuel and energy, to improvements in the quality and modernity of production, and to a further increase in production, suited to social needs, for the market and for export. It will be a matter likewise of increasing the productivity of personnel, and also of a distinct improvement in the effectiveness of management, general application of proper organization of work, and strengthening of the principles of socialist justice, public law and order, which are based on conscious discipline and an steadfast observance of socialist law.

The new initiatives should also serve the further improvement of the working and living conditions of personnel.

The working people have been immensely committed to the realization of the decisions of the Sixth and Seventh PZPR Congresses. The results achieved to date are an expression of the immense possibilities which dwell in the creative inventiveness of workers, engineers, technicians, and all working people in Poland.

This trend of social mobilization and commitment should be strengthened. Today it is singularly necessary.

In an atmosphere of full commitment and support for the resolutions of the Party, by production deeds we will be able to achieve better results than those set forth in the plan for 1978.

Comrade!

We turn to all plant trade union and youth organizations and to administrative directors to undertake actions to spread in our country the movement of socialist work competition, which will contribute to the further development of our fatherland, People's Poland.

We turn to the leading workers and to leading brigades so that they might, by their patriotic attitude and commitment, give an example of how to carry out the plan for the third year of the current five-year plan.

In every plant we are carrying out a searching analysis of all possibilities for carrying out our tasks.

Let the realization of the resolutions of the Ninth PZPR Central Committee Plenum and the Second PZPR National Conference release new forms and contents in socialist work competition.

Let universal participation in competition be the signal for new efforts, beautiful new achievements on behalf of the development of our socialist fatherland, the strengthening of its power, and the deepening of the process of socialist democracy; let it be the expression of loyalty to our Party and its program for the socioeconomic development of the country.

Participants in the National
Conference of Work Competition

CSO: 2600

ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU SPEAKS AT FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S ACCREDITATION

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 21 Dec 77 p 5 AU

[Report on speech by President Nicolae Ceausescu at 20 December accreditation ceremony of French ambassador to Bucharest Pierre Cerles]

[Text] Upon receiving the credentials of the French ambassador, the president of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, expressed thanks for the praise given Romania and for the wishes conveyed, and in turn conveyed to the president of the French Republic and to the French Government and people cordial greetings and best wishes for health and happiness, progress and prosperity.

In his reply speech, the Romanian head of state expressed satisfaction with the close relations of friendship and cooperation between Romania and France, relations which have developed steadily, especially in the past 10 years, and which are favored by the two peoples' affinities of language and culture and their profound aspirations for national independence, freedom and dignity. "This development," the speaker added, "has been strongly stimulated by contacts and talks at the highest level, by our joint desire to seize all opportunities for cooperation offered by the economic, cultural and scientific-technical potential of the two countries, and by our countries' interest in cooperating in the international arena to insure peace and security in Europe and in the world."

The speaker then stressed that "extensive possibilities exist for deepening the Romanian-French political dialog, and for further developing our relations in all fields of activity, in the interests of both people and of the cause of progress, peace and security."

After noting that "Romania places special emphasis on promoting extensive relations of cooperation with all states in the world, and on the participation of all states, regardless of size and social system, in international exchanges of material and intellectual assets, and on finding peaceful solutions to mankind's problems," the speaker said: "in this spirit, we appreciate the progress made at the Belgrade conference and hope that it

will end with the adoption of new concrete measures to promote economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation between the European states, and particularly, specific measures for military disengagement, without which one cannot speak of security and peace in Europe and in the world."

The Romanian head of state wished the French ambassador success in fulfilling his mission, and assured him of the full support of the State Council, the government and of himself."

CSO: 2700

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY RCP NATIONAL CONFERENCE

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 11 Dec 77 pp 1, 3 AU

[Text of resolution adopted by RCP National Conference held in Bucharest 7-9 December 1977]

[Text] The RCP National Conference held in Bucharest 7-9 December 1977 is an event of great importance in the life of the party and of all our society. Because of their realistic and profoundly scientific nature, the decisions adopted will insure an improvement in the qualitative standard of the socioeconomic activity and increase the national income, they will improve the living standard of all our people to a greater extent and insure a more determined advance on the road of building the comprehensively developed socialist society and communism in Romania.

The conference highly evaluates and unanimously approves the report presented by the party secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, on the implementation of the 11th congress decisions, of the RCP program and on the future tasks. It is a great model of creatively dealing--in the spirit of the concept of dialectical and historical materialism--with basic development problems in Romanian society at this time and in the future. The conference fully endorses the profound analysis made in the report on the activity carried out in all sectors of socialist construction in the 3 years that have elapsed since the congress, as well as the direction in which the party and state's efforts and the efforts of all people must aim in the next 3 years of the current Five-Year Plan and in the future. It endorses the theoretical ideas and theses in the report and the tasks and practical recommendations formulated in connection with the development of the economy and of the entire political and social life in our fatherland.

Stressing the exceptional significance of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's report, the conference decides that it should be the foundation of the further progress of the entire activity carried out by the party bodies and organizations, by the state bodies and the other bodies in our society, by all working people and that it should serve as a program document designed to guide the efforts to implement the 11th RCP Congress decisions.

The conference expresses satisfaction with the great achievements recorded in all sectors of the socioeconomic activity since the 11th congress, achievements which are extensively and convincingly reflected in Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's report.

All these achievements confirm the realistic nature of the Five-Year Plan provisions and of the party program. They confirm the correctness of our country's domestic and foreign policy, which is based on the creative application of truths and general laws of scientific socialism to the concrete conditions and realities in Romania. Being a result of the diligent and selfless work of the workers class, of the peasantry and intellectuals and of all the citizens in our fatherland, regardless of nationality, the successes recorded in past years illustrate the firm determination with which all the people, closely rallied around the party, are implementing the program on building the comprehensively developed socialist society and on Romania's advance toward communism.

The conference stresses especially the decisive role of and contribution made by the party secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, to the great progress recorded by our society, to formulating and implementing the domestic and foreign policy and to leading the entire activity of the party and state. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's untiring activity in the service of the vital interests of the Romanian people and the general cause of socialism and peace, his noble example of dynamism, innovating spirit and revolutionary courage and of communist intransigence and fervent patriotism inspires all communists and all people in their efforts aimed at Socialist Romania's flourishing and at raising it onto new levels of civilization and progress.

I.

The party National Conference endorses and approves the targets and guidelines in Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's report on priority tasks to commendably implement all provisions of the Five-Year Plan and of the supplementary program on Romania's socioeconomic development in 1976-1980.

1. In the spirit of the report presented by the party secretary, the National Conference stresses that what is essential for fulfilling the complex and mobilizing tasks incumbent upon our people in the next years of the current Five-Year Plan is that the qualitative aspect of the economic activity should be stressed. For this purpose, the conference establishes the following priority targets and guidelines:

a) Raising the technical and qualitative level of all products, a field in which revolutionary changes have to take place in the coming 3 years; the National Conference acknowledges Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's remark that it is about time to determinedly and energetically proceed from the stage of quantitative accumulation to a new and higher stage, the stage of improving quality, of turning quantity into quality--a primary requirement on which depends the future of Romanian industry.

b) The conference believes that it is necessary to give an impetus to the research activity in all sectors, to shorten the research-design-production cycle so as to achieve new materials, new and highly efficient machines and equipment, to reduce raw materials, fuel and energy consumption with a view to increasing labor productivity to a greater extent.

c) A more rapid development of the domestic raw material base by accelerating the utilization of known resources, by rationally making use of raw materials, increasing their efficiency, by redesigning products and by applying the most progressive technologies.

d) Insuring and rationally managing fuels and energy by utilizing brown coal, lignite and bituminous shales reserves, by accelerating the program on building hydropower stations, by utilizing new resources such as solar energy, wind energy and marine energy, as well as thermal waters and other such resources.

e) A more pronounced increase in labor productivity on the basis of a more rapid mechanization and automation both of production processes and of the account keeping and management of units, on the basis of firmly applying the programs of improving the professional training of all personnel and of scientifically organizing the production process and labor.

f) A rapid increase in fixed funds efficiency, reducing investment expenditures, fully utilizing production capacities, achieving economically advantageous manufacturing structures.

g) Increasing the degree of utilizing materials and raw materials, achieving highly technical products of better quality.

h) Reducing production costs, especially material expenditures to a greater extent by taking action in all units to make judicious use of funds, by combating any form of waste and by achieving greater profits.

2. In the field of agriculture, the National Conference establishes--as Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's report shows--that this basic branch of our economy should place primary stress on implementing the Five-Year Plan provisions and the supplementary measures which aim at eliminating lags and implementing special programs adopted in past years. Special attention must be paid to rationally utilizing lands, to increasing grain crops and the number of animals in order to achieve better average and gross outputs in this sector. Determined action must be taken to improve the activity in state agricultural enterprises, to improve the organizational framework of production and labor in agricultural production cooperatives, and to strengthen discipline and increase the production and economic efficiency in all units.

3. The National Conference believes that achieving investments in time and at a higher qualitative level is a particularly important task in the

next 3 years on which depends the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan targets under favorable conditions.

4. In the field of foreign trade, the National Conference endorses the task stressed in the report, namely to act to expand and further improve foreign economic relations, to strictly observe the equilibrium of the trade balance of the foreign payments balance, to promote new and better forms of cooperation to a greater extent and to increase the efficiency of economic cooperation ventures and of the entire foreign trade.

II.

The National Conference highly evaluates and fully endorses the program on increasing the living standard in 1976-1980 to a greater extent, a program drawn up on the initiative and under the guidance of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu.

1. The National Conference endorses the principled guidelines in the report of the party secretary general: an additional increase in labor productivity; insuring a more pronounced increase in incomes from work, especially in remuneration; preserving the existing ratio between minimum and maximum remuneration and implementing the principles of socialist ethics and equity; increasing the incomes of the peasantry, improving the pension system of members of agricultural production cooperatives and introducing pensions for private farmers in accordance with increasing agricultural production; a more rational utilization of funds for social and cultural purposes; increasing social insurance pensions and children's state allowances and allowances for mothers with several children and other allowances; increasing the volume of goods delivered from market stocks, modernizing and diversifying the range of products and improving the quality of consumer goods; developing and improving services and increasing them more rapidly than envisaged by initial provisions, accelerating housing construction and improving the quality of construction work; intensifying the activity of planning urban and rural localities; and maintaining price indexes within the Five-Year Plan limits.

2. The National Conference believes that setting incomes on a better basis makes it necessary to apply the measure initiated by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu aimed at improving certain provisions in the remuneration law, in the sense of establishing a new category for all wage rates, differentiating remuneration between categories and grades to a greater extent and improving the forms of remuneration to insure the general application of the overall contract system.

3. Along the line of improving the living standard of all people to a greater extent, the National Conference endorses the measures in the report on gradually reducing the work week from 48 to 44 hours beginning 1 January 1978 and stresses that to effectively apply these measures it is necessary to commendably fulfill all plan tasks.

4. The National Conference stresses the importance of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's assessment that the programs on an additional increase in production and of the living standard constitute a uniform whole; only a simultaneous and complete fulfillment of these targets can insure a more rapid development of the economy and raise the degree of material and cultural civilization of all people onto a higher level.

The National Conference expresses its conviction that the program on improving the living standard in the current Five-Year Plan--an expression of the profound humanism of the entire policy practiced by the party--will mobilize all working people even more--Romanian, Hungarian, German and other nationalities--to implement in an exemplary manner all economic tasks of the current Five-Year Plan.

III.

The National Conference unanimously endorses the general guidelines formulated by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu on drawing up the future Five-Year Plan on socioeconomic development on the basis of which up to 1985 Romania will leave behind the stage of a developing country and enter the stage of an average developed country. The National Conference believes that the new Five-Year Plan--drawn up in the light of the party program on building the comprehensively developed socialist society and Romania's advance toward communism--will be a new step forward in developing the production forces at an intensive rate, a fact that will bring about important changes in the country's social structure, in social and production relations; it will accentuate the process of bringing physical and intellectual work closer and narrow the gap between the working and living conditions in villages and towns and raise our society onto a higher level of civilization.

IV.

1. The conference evaluates highly the measures taken by the party, at Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's direct initiative, to create and improve the organizational framework--both in socioeconomic units in towns and communes and throughout the country--unique in its nature, that will insure the direct participation of all categories of working people, regardless of nationality, in leading the economy, social life and the entire society.

The National Conference stresses that the proper operation of these bodies is decisive and it ascribes great importance to the measures taken at Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's initiative to insure a greater participation of the working people working directly in the production process in various democratic state and civic bodies.

Of basic, principled and practical importance for successfully building socialism is the thesis formulated by Comrade Ceausescu in his report to the National Conference regarding the increased role of the working class in society's leadership, not only through its representatives in various forums, but directly in the concrete activity in various socioeconomic

fields. At the same time, the National Conference believes that firm action must be taken to select leadership cadres from among the ranks of the workers class who will assume direct responsibility in implementing the policy of the Communist Party--the ruling party in the Socialist Republic of Romania.

2. Stressing the profoundly democratic essence of the 20 November 1977 election of deputies to the communal, city and municipal people's councils and to the districts of Bucharest municipality, the conference believes that both its outcome and the composition of the new deputies forcefully show the unity of all people with the RCP--the leading political force of our socialist nation. The National Conference endorses the report recommendations on further improving the organizational framework and activity of people's councils, increasing the sense of responsibility of deputies, executive committees, of mayors and chairmen in resolutely observing the state's laws.

3. The conference endorses the report's assessments and recommendations on the need to continuously improve the socialist state and to increase its role in the uniform leadership of the entire socioeconomic life and in insuring the fatherland's independence and sovereignty, in strengthening the armed forces, the country's defense capability and in insuring the Romanian people's peaceful and creative activity.

4. The National Conference adopts the measures drawn up on the initiative of the party secretary general regarding the improved activity of the state bodies and of socialist legislation.

The entire activity in this field must proceed on the basis of respect for the Constitution and the country's laws by resolutely combating any violation of socialist legality and of lawful order. The bodies of the Ministry of the Interior, of the Prosecutor's Office and of justice are called upon to strictly and determinedly defend the revolutionary achievements and the values of our new society, to insure public order and quiet and to guarantee the citizens rights and individual property.

5. The conference endorses the measure that in punishing people who have violated the law one should proceed according to the principle that, as a rule, in cases of violations which do not present great social danger--especially in juvenile cases--the wrongdoers should not be deprived of their freedom, and their reeducation should take place under the supervision of the working collectives in socialist unity and while carrying out a useful activity. In cases of serious violations people should firmly be sentenced to imprisonment.

V.

The National Conference stresses with particular satisfaction the conclusion that the excellent successes recorded by the Romanian people in all fields of activity since the 11th congress are indissolubly linked with

the party's fulfilling its leading political role in all socioeconomic life.

1. The National Conference fully endorses the requirement formulated in the report presented by the party secretary general that each sector of society should carry out its activity under the direct leadership of the party organizations, and the assessment that strengthening the party's leading role in all fields requires that all problems should be discussed together with all people, that the links with the masses should be developed, the concern with continuously improving the work style and method of the party bodies and organizations should be greater and that the dynamic and mobilizing nature of the communists in each working collective should be increased.
2. The National Conference stresses the need, emphasized in the report, to constantly pay attention to developing party democracy, to discussing all party problems and the country's domestic and foreign policy problems within the party. At the same time, party democracy requires firm discipline, a sense of responsibility in fulfilling decisions and tasks incumbent upon each party organization and member.
3. The National Conference endorses the report's assessment on the party's composition and that of the party cadres. At the same time, it unanimously approves the guidelines stressed by the party secretary general to increase concern for promoting in party activity those cadres who come from among the ranks of the working class and concern for their ideological-political training and that of all party cadres so as to arm them with a revolutionary concept of the world, with dialectical and historical materialism and with the ideas resulting from the party decisions and from Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's speeches.
4. The National Conference endorses all recommendations of the report regarding the need to intensify activity in the socialist education of the masses, improving their level of knowledge and culture and of shaping the new man.

VI.

The National Conference notes with satisfaction that life and the evolution of events in past years have fully confirmed the correctness and clear-sightedness of the assessments made by the 11th congress, of the RCP Program on the international situation and of the party's and state's guidelines and activity in the foreign policy field. Expressing adherence by all people, the National Conference fully endorses the foreign policy, the extensive and dynamic international activity carried out by the party and state since the [11th] congress.

The RCP National Conference expresses its great appreciation and regard for the decisive contribution made by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, party secretary general and president of the republic, to formulating and implementing the party's and state's foreign policy, for his tremendous activity

permeated with a profound principled and revolutionary spirit carried out in the international arena in the service of the goals of socialism, asserting the sacred right of all peoples to freedom and independence, establishing new relations of equality and mutual respect among nations and in the service of achieving a new world economic order.

1. The conference endorses the profound analysis contained in Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's report, made on the basis of our revolutionary concept of creative Marxism-Leninism, of current international life; it endorses the characterization of various basic trends of the contemporary epoch whose principal direction is the ever more powerful assertion of the people's desire to stop the imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist policy of force and diktat and to develop freely and as masters of their destiny.

The conference stresses the exceptional importance of the thesis included in the report regarding the fact that we are now witnessing a strong intensification of the struggle for a new redivision of the world, of spheres of influence, so that various states or groups of states are able to win new dominating positions, a fact that accentuates the contradictions and trends that inevitably lead to new conflicts and wars and, at the same time, stress the truly historic responsibility of the peoples, of the progressive and anti-imperialist forces which are called upon to unite their efforts and to take increasingly energetic action to eliminate the serious dangers that threaten the free and independent development of all nations and peace and security throughout the world. The conference endorses the assessment in connection with the progressive forces' capability to insure the advance of mankind along the road of progress and civilization, peace and security on our planet.

2. The conference unanimously endorses the positions and guidelines established for the future activity of the party and state at the international level in conformity with the RCP program and with the 11th congress decisions.

3. Expressing complete satisfaction with developing all-round relations between Romania and all the socialist countries, the National Conference particularly appreciates the decisive contribution made by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's meetings and talks with the party and state leaders of various countries. The conference stresses that in its international activity Romania will continue to give priority to developing friendship and cooperation with all socialist countries, in keeping with the interests of socialist and communist construction in each country individually and in keeping with the general interests of socialism.

4. The conference stresses Romania's determination to continue to intensify relations with the developing countries. Close cooperation with these countries is in keeping both with the requirement of accelerating socio-economic progress and with strengthening solidarity in the struggle against

the imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist policy, for each people's right to master its destiny and for establishing a new international economic order.

5. In the spirit of the principles of peaceful coexistence, Romania will consistently act in the future as well to expand relations with the developed capitalist countries and will participate ever more actively in the international division of labor and the world exchange of values.

6. We will continue to firmly base Romania's international relations with all states on the principles of fully equal rights, respect for national independence and sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, mutual advantage, and renunciation of the use of threat of force.

7. The National Conference fully endorses the report's view on the road to achieving European security. According to its principled and constructive position, Romania will struggle with all its strength so that the Belgrade meeting will contribute to resolving the basic problems of security and cooperation on our continent and especially to adopting new effective measures for military disengagement and disarmament on the continent, without which one cannot speak of real security in Europe and throughout the world.

8. The National Conference fully agrees with the principled position reasserted in the report regarding the need to resolve the Middle East situation by political means, by direct negotiations between the sides concerned and believes that it is imperative to rapidly resume the Geneva conference with the participation of all countries concerned, including the PLO, so as to establish a lasting and just peace that will lead to Israel's withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, to resolving the Palestinian people's problem in keeping with their national aspirations--including the creation of an independent Palestinian state--and to insuring the integrity and security of all states in that area.

9. In order to eliminate underdevelopment and to accelerate the people's progress on the African Continent, the National Conference stresses the need to settle the various conflicts among the states on that continent by negotiations, a continent where a longstanding imperialist and colonial domination has generated and left unsolved numerous complicated problems.

The National Conference expresses our party's and state's active support and the support of all the Romanian people for the struggle for independence waged by the peoples in Rhodesia and Namibia, for the struggle of the people in South Africa against apartheid. In firmly condemning the aggressive military acts by the racist and reactionary circles in Rhodesia and the South African Republic against Mozambique and other neighboring countries, Romania reasserts its solidarity with the struggle to completely eliminate colonial domination, for the peoples' right to master their own destiny.

10. Socialist Romania will continue to struggle for the elimination of the chasms between states, of the signs of underdevelopment and for establishing a new international economic order that will insure the more rapid progress of countries lagging as a result of longstanding imperialist and colonialist policy.

11. The RCP National Conference believes that it is vitally imperative for the contemporary world to intensify the struggle to achieve disarmament and primarily nuclear disarmament. The conference stresses in this connection the great importance of holding the special UN session in the spring of 1978 devoted to disarmament.

12. Romania will continue to struggle for democratizing relations among states, for insuring the active participation of small and medium-sized countries, of developing countries and nonaligned states in resolving international problems. It will act to increase the role of the United Nations and of the other international organizations in insuring peace, security and fruitful cooperation among all nations.

13. The conference fully endorses the analysis made by the party secretary general regarding the current processes in the world communist movement, as well as the principled line of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's report on which our party bases its relations with the other parties by respecting each one's legitimate right to act in an autonomous manner and to creatively apply the general truths to the specific conditions under which it is struggling to make its contribution to continuously developing and improving the common heritage of the revolutionary theory and practice of the communist and workers movement.

The National Conference reasserts the RCP's determination to continue to act to develop relations of solidarity and comradely cooperation with all communist and workers parties, proceeding from the need to strengthen the unity of the international communist and workers movement, on the basis of full equality and noninterference in internal affairs, and each party's right to independently formulate its political line in keeping with the conditions in which it carries out its activity.

The conference reasserts once again our party's determination--adopted already by the 11th congress--not to engage in blaming other parties but to militate consistently for clarifying problems by discussions between parties and between leaderships and to contribute to strengthening the unity of international communist and workers movement.

14. The RCP will also develop relations with the socialist and social-democratic parties, in the interest of social progress, detente and peace. It will strengthen cooperation with the national liberation movements, with the ruling parties in countries that have won independence and are struggling for independent socioeconomic development and with other democratic parties in all states.

15. The RCP National Conference endorses the idea contained in the report that the popular masses and all peoples must actively participate in world political life in order to insure a new trend in international life. The conference stresses the RCP's decision to do all it can in the future to strengthen cooperation and solidarity with all progressive and anti-imperialist forces and with all peoples of the world to make its active contribution to the triumph of the aspirations for peace and progress of all peoples.

The National Conference adopts the report on the supplementary program on Romania's socioeconomic development in the 1976-1980 period which will contribute to more rapidly developing the production forces and to increasing socialist Romania's productive potential.

The National Conference adopts the general guidelines on formulating the Five-Year Plan for Romania's socioeconomic development in the 1981-1985 period which open prospects for generally improving the level of the material and cultural civilization of all people and our country's transition to the stage of a country with an average development level.

The National Conference adopts the program on increasing the living standard in the 1976-1980 period and improving the remuneration law which will insure an improvement in the material and cultural living standard of all people.

The National Conference adopts the measures on reducing the work week--a telling proof of the party's and state's concern with constantly improving the work and living conditions of all citizens.

The National Conference adopts the report on the activity carried out to eliminate the consequences of the 4 March 1977 earthquake and highly appreciates the firm measures taken by the party leadership to normalize economic and social life, the heroic and devoted work of the party bodies and organizations, and the broad working masses to eliminate the consequences of the earthquake.

The National Conference adopts the measures on improving the leadership of all sectors of activity, of the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, on improving the legislation of the Socialist Republic of Romania and on developing socialist democracy to insure the ever broader participation of the masses of working people in formulating and implementing the party and state's domestic and foreign policy, and to intensify the activity of socialist education and implement the norms and principles of socialist ethics and equity.

Expressing the conviction that the decisions adopted are in keeping with the basic interests of our socialist nation, that they will raise the country onto a new level of socioeconomic development and insure the continuous improvement of the people's well-being and their happiness, the National Conference appeals to the communists, the entire party, the working class,

the peasantry, intellectuals, the working people, regardless of nationality, to the young people and old people, to men and women and to all our people to implement with enthusiastic determination the targets on which depends the accelerated advance of our dear fatherland on the road to socialist civilization.

The National Conference appeals to the workers, the leading class in our society, to act with devotion and revolutionary enthusiasm to implement all targets and tasks included in the report to develop industry at a high rate, to raise all economic activity onto a qualitatively higher level, to increase labor productivity more rapidly, reduce material and production expenditures, substantially increase economic efficiency, and to broadly apply the most advanced achievements of science and technology to production. Dear comrades, spare no effort to implement the primary task set by the party secretary general--to turn quantity into a new quality, thus making your contribution to successfully implementing the party's policy on forcefully developing and modernizing the forces of production of the country and of the entire national economy.

The National Conference calls upon the peasantry and upon all working people in agriculture to devote all their energy, skill and work energy to intensively develop agriculture, properly manage and rationally utilize lands, and broadly apply modern agrotechnical methods to obtain greater harvests and achieve or even exceed the growth rate of agricultural, vegetable and animal production envisaged for the coming period in order to ever better meet the people's requirements for consumer goods and the needs of the entire national economy.

The National Conference appeals to our fatherland's intellectuals to devote, together with the workers and peasantry and with all people, all their knowledge and skill to the continuous progress and development of Romanian science, to more closely linking research with the production process and with the concrete requirements of the country's socioeconomic development. Do all you can to contribute to an ever greater extent to implementing the 11th congress targets on the forceful assertion of the scientific-technical revolution in Romania in the current Five-Year Plan!

Men of culture and art, use all your talent and creative force to continuously develop our socialist art and culture, to enrich the intellectual life of the people, to educate and develop the socialist awareness of the masses, and to cultivate the noble traits of the new man of our society!

Young people throughout our country, our party is preparing an ever brighter future, an ever more prosperous and happy life for youth. Work with all your youthful enthusiasm, with all your energies, so that the great projects that we have planned for the immediate future may be achieved under optimum conditions. Be always in the front ranks of the struggle to promote what is new in production, to insure better organization of labor, and exemplary order and discipline at each work place!

Women in all the fields of activity, do everything in your power and use your management skills and working capabilities to contribute even more to the socioeconomic development of the fatherland, to the good administration of the fatherland's towns and villages, and to the implementation of all our party and state policies, whose supreme goal is man's welfare and happiness, the progress and development of our entire nation!

Working people, Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and people of other nationalities, work in close unity, under the party leadership, so that your united work and efforts will raise our common fatherland to ever higher levels of civilization and progress. Work devotedly so that our country can advance ever more resolutely along the bright path of socialism and communism!

Communists, show that you are up to the great responsibilities incumbent on our party in leading the historic construction of the new society, and work with all your strength and skill to broadly mobilize the nation's energies in the work and struggle to implement the party's policy of the socioeconomic development of the country, and of raising all the people's living standard! do everything in your power to insure the successful implementation of the party program on building the comprehensively developed socialist society and on Romania's advancement toward communism!

Working people, citizens of the socialist republic of Romania!

Let us never forget that our work is at the basis of the people's happiness and of the country's prosperity, and that we are capable of forging an ever better and happier life.

Let us work energetically and devotedly to implement the national conference decisions, which are opening up new bright prospects for rapidly developing the production forces, improving social relations, and the organization and leadership of our society!

Let us close our ranks even more tightly around the party, its Central Committee, and Secretary General Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, so as to fulfill the historic decisions of the conference, and to build the most just system in mankind's history on Romanian soil--the socialist and communist system.

The RCP National Conference expresses the conviction that the entire party and all the people will do everything they can to fulfill the historic decisions adopted. The conference is convinced that all the party members, all working people in our country--Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and of other nationalities--will mobilize all their energies, skills and creative talents to exemplarily fulfill the Five-Year Plan, including the additional measures, with a view to fulfilling the historic decisions of the 11th congress and of the party program on building the comprehensively developed socialist society and on Romania's advancement toward communism.

CURRENT ROMANIAN SITUATION DISCUSSED BY FRENCH PAPER

Paris LE MONDE in French 7, 8 Dec 77

[Article by Manuel Lucbert: "Economic Progress and Excessive Centralism"]

[7 Dec 77, p 4]

[Text] Bucharest--Every trip back to Bucharest provokes the same strange and ambiguous feeling, that of finding oneself among people who are astonishingly close to us because of their language and culture and yet so disconcerting, so changeable in their behavior that at times they become elusive. This pliability of character--or this extreme adaptability--which has given birth over 2 centuries to superb diplomats, is this the price imposed by history, the price to be paid for the survival of the nation?

The regime, which has made the teaching of history one of the bases of its political program directed toward the masses and especially toward youth, has just decided to solemnly celebrate the 2050th anniversary of the creation of the first empire by King Burebista. The Dacians are to the Romanians what the Gauls are to the French. As for Burebista, he is said to have died the same year as Cesar.

Without extraordinary tenacity, at least equal to their ability to adapt, the Romanians would undoubtedly not have succeeded in surviving through the centuries in this exposed corner of Europe which was called in the past, with slight condescension, Moldo-Walachia. Consciousness of the role of chance remains very strong among them and it explains in part the policy of the current leaders: an intensive economic development aiming to create a strong state on the domestic level, a permanent search for maximum independence and concern for the balance of power in foreign policy.

No one disputes, today, this country's economic progress, a country which is after all richly endowed by nature. No one denies either that the sacrifices exacted from the population to achieve it have been and

remain very heavy. But the figures are there: Romania, with its 21 million inhabitants, will this year produce some 11 million tons of steel, more than 14 million tons of petroleum, 64 billion kwh of electricity and about 27 billion cubic meters of methane (one of the very first producers in the world). The automobile industry is still only getting started: 70,000 vehicles are now being turned out every year by the Pitesti factory. (To own a Dacia 1300, the Romanian model of the Renault 12, is still a luxury, since the purchase price is 70,000 lei, while the average salary is around 2,000 lei.) However, thanks to an agreement signed this year with Citroen, production should reach from 200,000 to 250,000 vehicles per year around 1981.

The Supply Situation Seems Improved

The country is self-sufficient as far as grain is concerned. The 1977 harvest should be a little smaller (18 million tons) than the record one of last year (20 million tons), but reserves have been set up. To judge from the shop windows, at least in Bucharest, and according to the residents, the supply situation seems improved since the crisis of fall 1975, which had required urgent measures. This result was achieved thanks especially to a reduction in agricultural exports. There are shortages, openly admitted, which still exist concerning cooking oil, sugar and even meat. The growth of cattle and sheep raising has, indeed, remained below the forecasts. A special effort has been announced for next year.

Foreign trade activity has been conducted with prudence. Romania is one of the Eastern countries which has the lowest amount of debt to the West. The Third World markets are systematically developed because the Bucharest leaders have no illusions about their capacity to greatly increase their sales in the Western countries. The case of trade exchanges with France is a good example in that respect. Although during the last few years, there was a tendency toward reduction of the Romanian negative balance of trade, the deficit will undoubtedly be doubled by the end of this year (from 150 to 300 million francs).

On the whole, the economic situation appears therefore rather favorable and President Ceausescu can congratulate himself during the party's national convention. Almost total energy independence, two consecutive good harvests and a fairly efficient "piloting" of the "machine" by the administrators of industry and commerce are largely responsible for these successes. Encouraged by this situation, at the last meeting of the Central Committee in October the leaders adopted a program for increasing production, within the framework of the current 5-year period, amounting to 130 billion lei.

Discontent

In these conditions, how can one explain the discontent this summer among the miners of the Giu valley and which seems to have had repercussions in

other industrial centers as far away as Bucharest? The immediate causes of this crisis have been identified: modification of the law on pensions abolishing certain benefits, poor supply of the worker centers, poor working conditions. There are also more profound causes. More difficult to change than a law or a distribution system, they expose the Romanian regime, just as other Eastern societies are exposed, to bad surprises: the economic side is too obviously favored to the detriment of the social side; the mechanisms for consultation or worker participation are virtually nonexistent; the style of governing the country remains as authoritarian and personal as in the past.

The rate of accumulation set by the planners for the current 5-year period is the highest in Eastern Europe (aside from Albania): it represents 33 to 34 percent of the national income. This index has been maintained in the 1978 plan. Consumption is therefore deliberately sacrificed. The adoption of a program of increased production testifies to the same strong determination to exceed at any price objectives which are already ambitious. For the first 2 years of the five-year plan, a surplus of some 38 billion lei has been accumulated. To carry out the 130 billion program, the productivity of labor will still have to be increased.

Governing by Decrees

To a certain extent, next year's plan, however, takes more into account the needs of the consumers: the income of the population will increase more rapidly (+7.9 percent) than this year (+6.1 percent). The volume of consumer goods and services is also progressing quite clearly. It is partly the consequence of increases in salaries which began this summer and will continue until September 1978. Another series of increases will be granted from February 1979 on. In all, during the 5-year period, salaries will be increased on the average by 30 percent instead of the 20 percent initially planned.

The national convention should ratify the decision to reduce progressively from next 1 January on, the length of the work week from the current 48 hours (or more) to 46, then 44 hours. However, this operation will take several years.

More difficult to implement is the dialog--the word is much used these days--with the population. The party is so conscious that the union has lost any usefulness in this area--contrary to the timid hopes nourished here as elsewhere a few years ago--that this year it created workers' councils. The union being definitively confined to sociocultural activities, the councils are to take its place in its lost economic and ideological functions. But this organization seems completely bureaucratic. Its structure is copied from the party's, whose role and presence it aims to reinforce in the economic sphere. At the bottom, in the firms, the president of the workers' councils is the secretary

of the party organization. He has under his command the factory manager. At the top, the chief of state himself heads the entire system.

The national council, created in agriculture on the same model, is directed by the head of the government. Basically, it is always the same people who "dialog" with the same people.

This strong centralization of power is a specific characteristic of the Romanian system. To this tendency is added the personal management style of President Ceausescu whose cult has not weakened since the last party congress, 3 years ago. Most of the decisions are made on his "own initiative." His "inestimable contribution" in all kinds of activity is endlessly emphasized. The practice of governing by presidential decrees or those of the State Council (which is presided over by Mr Ceausescu) has firmly been established. It led at times to incomprehensible situations, as is demonstrated by the way in which the new national anthem was recently adopted.

With economic development--the Marxists would say the development of productive forces--Romania, like other more advanced communist countries before it, found itself more and more at odds with political structures which are inadequate for a modern and industrialized state. Still timid, the desire for democracy--if only within the socialist framework--should make itself felt more. This country will not soon lose its reputation as the "Sparta of the Balkans."

[8 Dec 77, p 7]

[Text] The Constant Quest for Independence

In a previous article (LE MONDE of 7 December), Manuel Lucbert showed why, in spite of undeniable successes in economic matters, the Romanian regime, centralized to excess, is not in a position to respond to democratic demands, even timid ones. In his second article, he shows how Bucharest is attempting, in foreign policy, to affirm its independence.

Bucharest--The inhabitants of Bucharest who want to use these days the odd-numbered side of Boulevard Dacia, one of the main thoroughfares of the Romanian capital, are surprised to find themselves ordered at one point to cross the street and go on their way. In front of a rich-looking villa, a cordon of soldiers are standing guard in the bitter cold. An anti-riot vehicle has been stationed at the nearest crossroads. The place that is guarded with so many precautions is not the residence of a party dignitary, as this kind of security measures might make one believe, it is the Egyptian Embassy.

The same day that President Sadat was shaking Mr Menahem Begin's hand in Jerusalem, a group of Arab students residing in Bucharest was attacking the Egyptian Embassy and throwing a few files out the windows. Since then, the embassy has resembled a fortress under siege.

Public opinion has obviously not learned anything officially about this incident, just as generally speaking it learned almost nothing through the local news media about the role that Romania played in the preparation of the historic meeting in Jerusalem. This role, however, is now recognized and it is significant that the Bucharest leaders are observing a great deal of discretion on this subject. It completely corresponds to their conception of international relations and to their constant concern in demonstrating a presence outside the blocs while at the same time exerting an influence everywhere that it has felt it useful.

Against Double Hegemony

At the time of the Israeli prime minister's visit this summer in Bucharest, a little phrase of Mr Ceausescu had been intriguing. The Romanian chief of state had vigorously indicated that he did not intend to play "mediator." On the other hand, he added, we are always ready to serve as "go-between." This is what seems to have happened. Without plunging into political fiction, one can assert that the Romanians certainly seem to have rendered real services in this affair by presenting alternately to one side and the other the positions of the parties in question. This is alleged to have been the main objective of Mr Begin's trip to Bucharest during the month of August and Mr Sadat's at the end of October. The Romanians, however, deny that Mr Begin took advantage of his visit to make secret contacts with the participants.

Did the utilization of the Romanian "channel" contribute to the meeting between the two statesmen? It is impossible to know, but all national pride aside, the important thing for the Romanians is to have been part of the game and, better still, of one which succeeded. Hostile in principle to double hegemony, they can only congratulate themselves on having participated in the finishing touches to an operation which short-circuited, at least apparently, the two Great Powers. In this way they were able to apply the principle which they endlessly proclaim on the equality of nations and the role of medium-sized and small countries in the settlement of international problems.

That this policy does not please everybody should surprise no one. The Yugoslav neighbors, for instance, have not seemed delighted by the Romanian initiatives.

The communique from the last meeting between Presidents Tito and Ceausescu, on 3 and 4 December in Turnu-Severin on the Danube, emphasizes the "frankness" of the discussions. In diplomatic language, it is the sign of differences of opinion. Advocates of nonalignment and of independence, the Yugoslavs do not always look approvingly at Bucharest's competition on their own terrain. But in the Near East, Belgrade's diplomacy must admit that it has limited means of action since breaking off relations with Israel in 1973.

Those who are most unhappy about the Romanian attitude should, however, be the Soviets. All the more so since this affair takes place at a moment when the relations between Bucharest and Moscow are once again it seems, in a cooling off phase. Various signs noted over the last few months support this appraisal: the Romanian press did not make much of a fuss, for instance, on the subject of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution.

"We have accomplished our purpose," a smiling journalist told us. For once the objectives were not very ambitious.

There was something even better--or worse. The changing of the national anthem dropping the reference to the Romanian-Soviet "fraternity of arms" occurred at the end of October, or just a few days before the ceremonies which honored the memory of 1917 in Moscow. If he went to the Soviet capital on this occasion, Mr Ceausescu did not stay very long. Ignoring the military parade, he returned home right after his speech. A text which moreover was not remarkable for an excess of warmth.

Another little noticed sign whose importance must not be overlooked, could only have provoked Moscow's irritation. At the beginning of the summer, the Bucharest government decided to quietly withdraw its aircraft from the integrated air defense of the Warsaw Pact and to place it under Romanian command. Simultaneously, the contacts with China were reactivated after a period of "wait and see" which was justified by the power struggle in Peking.

On bad terms with Tirana, the Chinese seem to want to fall back on Bucharest which, obviously finds this situation advantageous. The number of official visits in both directions has increased since last summer. Mr Nikulescu-Mizil, a member of the executive political committee went to Peking. And Bucharest has welcomed the large Chinese military delegation which stayed in France this fall. At the same time Peking's representatives were in Bucharest, Mr Ceausescu was receiving General Kulikov, the supreme commander of the Warsaw Pact forces. According to Eastern diplomats, the talks did not go very well since the Romanians still refuse to authorize any maneuvers on their territory other than simple staff exercises.

Relations With Mr Carrillo

To complete the picture of Romanian-Soviet relations, one must remember the traditionally friendly bonds which have united Mr Ceausescu and Mr Carrillo since the time of the illegality of the Spanish Communist Party. The latter continues to be received in Bucharest, in spite of Moscow's rebuff toward him. The Romanian leaders certainly do not show any special sympathy for Eurocommunism or what has generally been called that. They are even quite far from it ideologically. What they defend is the right for each communist party and therefore also for theirs, to determine in complete freedom its domestic and foreign political line.

The almost permanent malaise in Romanian-Soviet relations must not be interpreted only as the consequence of a situation of inequality within the socialist camp and Romania's claim to the right to be recognized completely as a nation. Bucharest's broadest objectives in foreign policy render, so to speak, necessary these recurrent tensions, these disconcerting fever chills which are followed by phony embraces which are just as disconcerting.

Romania needs this diplomatic game. Its limits are known and regulated largely by the requirements of a domestic policy which is still not very liberal (the population's contacts with foreigners, for instance, are carefully controlled and dissidents are severely repressed). But they could be changed according to circumstances. It is therefore not a matter of legality but basically of practice under conditions which are different from the old policy of balance of power often adopted in the past by this country.

In this way, Romania can offer itself the luxury of "flirting" from time to time with the Western powers, even of being virtually admitted into their midst, as is the case currently at the Belgrade conference. The attention of the United States is naturally solicited with perseverance and Romanian diplomacy is said to be conscious of suffering a defeat if President Carter were to persist in wanting to overlook stopping in Bucharest on his future tours. The visit that Mr Macovescu, the minister of foreign affairs, has just made to Washington, is perhaps not without some relation to this question.

More and more, however, it is in the Third World that Romania is interested. A member of the so-called group of "77," a "permanent guest" among the nonaligned nations, Romania follows the development of the North-South dialog very closely. During the course of long tours, Mr Ceausescu has already gone to the African, Asian and Latin American continents. A few years from now, trade with developing countries should represent 30 percent of the whole of Romanian foreign trade, or as much as its trade with the West. Cultural and technical cooperation with these countries is already marked by the presence in Bucharest of several thousand Black and Arab students. Considering itself an old victim of imperialist plundering, but benefitting from a certain head-start on the road to development, Romania seems well enough equipped to fruitfully conduct its Third World policy.

Without doubt, the general directions will be reaffirmed by the national party convention. In this area, continuity is the rule. Also constant is the principle according to which a relatively original foreign policy corresponds to a "hard" domestic policy. Doesn't this contradiction explain the reticence that this strange mixture provokes sometimes among its population and abroad? Over the long term, in spite of the current successes, is it not the credibility of this policy which will be in question?

Just as in Lyssenko's Day

A French biologist of Romanian origin, Mr Denis Buican, sends us the following letter received from his Bucharest colleague, Dr Alexander Ionescu, who has been systematically prevented for 4 years from traveling to the West and especially to France where he has been invited several times by Professor Pierre Bourrelly of the National Museum of Natural History:

I have written to you less lately hoping that I could come to France for 2 to 3 weeks. Unfortunately, you are right again: we are hostages--and what is worse, we do not know of whom...! There is a travel order signed by the minister of agriculture, by the vice prime minister of the country, signed by the president of the full National Assembly, Professor Giosan. There exists a clear interest in our science: we are preparing a treatise on algology which will serve for 20 years and which will be used by all our university students during this period; I could also enumerate for you--and for those who read us--many more things, without bringing up human rights which, not being recognized for others, humiliate and disqualify--first of all--those who had the duty of making them respected.

All this, of course, is just theory...

In a certain sense, it is a provocation and one must have nerves of steel to resist. I want to create something, to arouse and maintain--and one cannot even imagine how important it is to maintain a spirit which, if it cannot be dedicated unreservedly to truth, must at least be near it. --When everything is happening as in the days of Lyssenko!

Mr Buican adds, for his part, this commentary:

When one knows that in the days of Stalin and his favorite "biologist," Lyssenko, Soviet biology and that of the colonized countries--including Romania--were destroyed and the scientists killed or imprisoned, one can imagine the totalitarian atmosphere which now reigns in Bucharest.

As to the question: "Whose hostage?," it is not too difficult to find an answer. If even the favorable opinions of the vice prime minister of the country, the president of the National Assembly and the minister of the specialty in question are not enough to obtain an exit visa for a few weeks of scientific exchange, the answer is quite clear: the special services of all-powerful regimes as in the Stalin period can allow themselves to trample not only human rights and international scientific exchanges, but also the members of their own government.

8956

CSO: 3100

ROMANIA

DISSIDENT INTERVIEWED BY FRENCH JOURNAL

Paris POLITIQUE HEBDO in French No 293, 12-18 Dec 77 pp 26-28

[Interview with Paul Goma dissident writer, by Sacha Blumkine]

[Text] Romania occupies a special place on the East European political checkerboard within the Balkan area. Its hallmark is a detectable independence in its relations with Moscow. In 1958, the Romanians obtained the departure of Soviet troops; the following year they signed their first economic agreements with the West. Romania, member of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, for whom the USSR is the primary economic partner, nevertheless manages an "open" foreign policy.

This relatively autonomous foreign policy is tied to a domestic policy of unbridled nationalism, which sometimes verges on musical comedy. Thus there is to be a solemn celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the first Roman Empire. And the Communist Party's Central Committee recently elevated Dracula to the rank he deserves, that of national hero.

But, although in 1964 the Romanian Party proclaimed "the sovereign right of every socialist state to expand, choose and change the forms and methods of its socialist structure," although in 1968 President Ceaucescu condemned Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and today supports Eurocommunism, the Romanian regime is still no less a caricature of Stalinism; a regime whose facade was shaken this year by more than earthquakes.

This February author Paul Goma and some of his friends sent an open letter to the Belgrade conference denouncing repression and demanding democratic guarantees. This is the first public manifestation of collective opposition to the regime since 1944. Three hundred persons, the majority of them workers, joined the appeal in spite of severe repressive measures visited upon the signers. Goma was arrested, beaten and insulted by the vice-minister of the interior himself, but was finally freed 5 weeks later.

In August, 35,000 miners went on strike, forcing Ceaucescu to cut short his vacation to meet them alone. This is the first strike of such proportions in 50 years. A significant event, which would frighten the regime to the

point that Ceaucescu immediately went to Brezhnev. Repressive measures were immediately taken against the miners, even though their living conditions were finally improved. Strike representatives were arrested and 16,000 persons throughout the country were transferred.

Today, Goma is in France with a tourist visa. The day of his departure the vice minister of the interior made sure he understood that "revolutionary justice has a long arm". But Paul Goma did not hesitate to testify, notably in this interview with POLITIQUE HEBDO.

The principal events in the life of dissident writer Paul Goma as covered here also cover Romanian Stalinism in its evolution and its present situation.

Paul Goma, who has not published anything in Romania since 1968, has had three novels published in France by Gallimard: "La cellule des liberables" (1971); "Elles etaient quatre...." (1974; "Gherla" (1976).

The most stupid bureaucracy in the world

Romania is one of the rare countries of Eastern Europe that has never known even a semblance of destalinization. In 1956 a parody was organized which consisted of getting on the back of a judeo-russian (by some strange chance) member of the political bureau for the single fault of producing more copies of Stalin's work than of Marx's.

Nicholas Ceaucescu's [sic] rise to power in 1965 was followed by a timid liberalization of the regime, but more by an exaltation of Romanian nationalism and by the exercise of personal power which the leader shares with no one--other than with his wife who is also a member of the political bureau. The presidential couple busy themselves with everything and govern by decree. They even had the statutes of the Academy of Science altered so that Madame Ceaucescu could become an Academician without possessing any title or having produced any scientific treatise. She took advantage of this to get herself decorated with the medal of scientific merit.

The cult of personality sometimes turns to the grotesque. Thus Ceaucescu, discreetly installed in rooms in the palace of the Romanian kings had himself photographed seated on a throne, the royal sceptre in his hand.

Passing through Toulouse, during an official visit to France, the Romanian president, learning that a southwest rugby team had been beaten by Romanians, and wishing to please his hosts, declared: "If I had known, I would have ordered the Romanians to lose."

Another remark of Ceaucescu to a journalist from the WASHINGTON POST "In Romania there is the laborer's congress, the railroad workers congress, the steelworkers congress. Here, you see, you don't chit-chat, you act.

In Romania we sometimes speak of Idi Amin Dadaescu.

[Question] What had you done up to 1968?

[Answer] I was 5 years old in 1940 and the Russians occupied what they called "Bessarabia", meaning "country without Arabs". Needless to say, there were no Arabs, only Romanians. Thus we were obliged to become Soviet citizens.

Early in 1944 my entire family fled to Romania, but after the occupation, Bessarabians were sought out by the new masters of the country who said they wanted to repatriate all "Soviet citizens". Finally my father faked our papers and so we got the "right" to remain Romanian citizens rather than the "honor" of becoming Soviet citizens. All our friends who went back to Bessarabia got to know the famous "brakeless train", which stopped only in Siberia.

In 1949 my parents were arrested on a false accusation of conspiracy. I was only 13 years old and was completely abandoned. I had to steal to live. When I was 16 I made a personal acquaintance with the political police. I had bragged to my friends that I could go join the partisans any time. For that I was arrested, beaten, and imprisoned for 5 weeks.

In 1956 I was jailed a second time: I gave a public reading in the school where I was studying, of extracts from a book on the events in Hungary. I was sentenced to 2 years of prison and 4 years of exile. Afterwards I could only work at semi-skilled jobs--stevedore, trumpet player (like Boris Vian), street photographer.

In 1965 Ceaucescu gave permission for former political prisoners to resume their studies. Suddenly the universities were filled with ex-cons, some with white hair. But I was soon obliged to quit my studies as the secret police wanted me to be a stool pigeon. I had begun to publish again, however, even winning a literary prize. I could earn my living with my pen.

In 1968 an unbelievable thing happened: Ceaucescu did not support his "brothers" and he condemned Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. For the rest of us, former prisoners, it was an astonishing moment. We had thought things had changed, that from now on we would have the right to say "Yes, we are Romanians", something which had been severely punished until then. (I have known people to be sentenced to more than 5 years of prison just for singing patriotic songs). Thus I joined the Communist Party for at the time it seemed to me to be the only force capable of resisting the Russians, if only for a few hours. Freedom lasted only two and a half days.

I succeeded in finding part time employment with a literary journal where I worked until 1972. Then, encouraged by Ceaucescu's statements affirming that the abuses of the Stalinist era were over, I wrote a novel in pure socialist realist-style, its prose conforming to the manner asked for by our "beloved leader". My book was rejected, as was a second, then a third. And presto--I was pushed into the ranks of "enemies of the people". With patience and industry, the authorities had made themselves an "enemy". They have an amazing talent for making enemies.

Having decided to break down the wall with my head, I sent my manuscripts out of the country, where they were published. The authorities began twisting my ears and wanted to expel me from the party. But strangely, the other members of my cell did not want to expel me. Then they took recourse to a strategem which French communists might find useful: it was declared that I had never been a member of the party because of some paperwork irregularities at the time I joined.

I was beginning to be embarrassing. I spent a year in France; then, against the advice of my friends, I returned to Romania, hoping to be published there, as I write in Romanian. My job with the literary journal had been taken. And as though we should be punished even more, my wife and I could no longer even publish translations. I was in despair until I learned of Czechoslovakia's "Charter 77".

Since I couldn't persuade my colleagues to join me in writing a letter of solidarity, I wrote it alone. Then I wrote to Ceaucescu, inviting him to renew his gesture of 1968, and join forces with the group in power in Prague. He didn't answer. Probably there was a problem with the post office.

[Question] It is remarkable that an opposition movement in Romania should begin with an expression of solidarity with Czechoslovakia's Charter 77.

[Answer] Yes, I could have made common cause with the Iranians or the Argentines, their sufferings are the same. Whether terror be communist, fascist, centrist, it is still terror. But the Charter 77 program seemed to me to have the best chance of succeeding, for it is reformist.

We have enough experience to know that we can't overturn the established power. There is a politics of blocs--Russians on one side, Americans on the other. In our camp--meaning the penal camp--countries such as Poland and Hungary have shown that they can make a livable life. Romanians look on Poland with envy: one can travel abroad, organize without too many risks, defend the workers, publish 'samizdats', yet Soviet troops are there. No so here. We are oppressed by ourselves. We look at ourselves in the mirror and spit in our own faces.

[Question] How is it that contrary to what has happened in other Eastern countries, the first open opposition was a demand for democratic rights?

[Answer] In other Eastern countries there was a well organized tradition of opposition. Not so here. We don't even have communist or socialist traditions. When it took power, the party had only a thousand members out of the country's 20 million population. From the beginning, there was savage repression of non-communists. Thus we never had personalities or groups within the party able to propose alternatives, to be in opposition. Result: the opposition movement was never organized.

For my part, I never became a leader. I played the role of detonator of the general discontent by manning, in a manner of speaking, a complaint department. But I feared that should I be arrested, our whole action would stop. But this was true for a short time only. After I was freed, small groups of friends and colleagues took up the fight on their own. But what is more significant, of the 300 signers of what is called the "Goma letter," more than 60 percent were workers. Our movement is truly from the people, not the intellectuals.

[Question] How do you explain the workers responding more to your movement than the intellectuals?

[Answer] The workers are the more persecuted, they have nothing to lose but their chains as Marx said. On the other hand, intellectuals have never taken risks here. If a writer is forbidden to travel abroad, it's a real tragedy. But for a worker whose pay is cut it is just more of the same, always the same poverty.

[Question] What role did your movement have in triggering August's strike of 35,000 miners?

[Answer] It could be said that the atmosphere created by our movement politicized the miners. One of them came to see me in February. He waited two hours at my door, I was away. He left me a letter saying: I came to bring you a handshake from the miners. The signers of the letter proved that one can dare to cry out against injustice without risking more than a few punches about the body as the boxers say.

But the miners' movement was totally independent. There had already been wildcat workers' revolts that came to nothing, lacking workers' traditions. The Juil region belonged to the Astro-Hungarian Empire, therefore the miners had a long para-union tradition. They found this tradition during the course of the strike, reviving the council of elders. They held out three days. That was terrific, very encouraging.

[Question] What political opinions dominate in the opposition group?

[Answer] Not having any socialist tradition, people in Romania are afraid to think politically. Rather than being a political affirmation, our movement is political rejection. Members of the opposition define themselves only in opposition to the existing regime, for we have no alternative.

[Question] How does the Romanian regime relate to socialism?

[Answer] It doesn't. Perhaps, for the first time, socialism might have a chance to materialize in Czechoslovakia. But for my part, the mere fact that the Russians have banned its expansion negates the possibility of such a society existing. I am neither a prophet nor a politician. My opinions deal more with morals. I am a writer and I make a cult of words. Some stereotyped

words such as communism and socialism should be changed. These words can't be spoken without raising ghosts: prisons, lies, injustices.

[Question] How much solidarity will workers of the West give to miners punished because of the strike?

[Answer] The western workers' movement could play a very important role. I could not speak to the unions and not to the parties, for the parties have always betrayed the little man and will continue to do so. The French unions must be shown to be guilty of obedience to the communists. The PCF received a delegation of the Romanian party led by Verdets, who directed the repression of the miners. This is complicity. I want to show the same of the American miners' unions, for the Romanian government has bought shares in American mines.

The Romanian government is very sensitive to western public opinion, especially when it concerns the fate of miners, for its own legitimacy is called into question.

8860

CSO: 3100

ROMANIA

ROMANIAN ROLE IN OCTOBER REVOLUTION DISCUSSED

Bucharest MAGAZIN ISTORIC in Romanian Nov 77 pp 30-32

/Article by Constantin Bredu/

/Text/ "A new era in the history of the world begins today. You have conquered the hearts of all oppressed peoples. You ask that no nation oppress another, that no nation be subjugated and that each people alone have the right to lead itself." So went one of the manifestos edited by Romanian socialists as a sign of solidarity with the struggle of the Russian proletariat in the days of October 1917. The ideals contained in this manifesto influenced the conscience of thousands of Romanian volunteers who joined the Red Army in the struggles to defend Soviet power. Alongside the international brigades and detachments to defend the first socialist state in the world, the workers evacuated along with some Romanian enterprises in Russia as well as Romanians from Transylvania incorporated in the Austro-Hungarian army and held prisoners, established in revolutionary battalions and military units, fought with devotion. As Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu showed, "The progressive forces, the working class in Romania, showed their solidarity with the heroic Russian proletariat, fighting to defend the young Soviet state, including with weapons in hand." We are publishing some excerpts from the memoirs of those--from the Ukraine to the Urals, from the Caucasus in the north and steppe of Turkestan to the Far East--who joined the Russian workers and soldiers in the fierce struggle to defend the first socialist revolution.*

* See "The Great October Socialist Revolution and the Revolutionary and Democratic Movement in Romania. Documents and Memoirs," Bucharest, 1967.

Ionita N. Dumitru: "Around the end of 1917 (in Odessa) the idea spread to establish a Romanian revolutionary battalion. I was among the first to join.

"When the interventionist troupes launched the attack against the young socialist state, I left for the front against them. I received the command of a platoon of the Romanian Revolutionary Battalion. Since we were wearing the same uniform as the Russian soldiers, we were given a white armband to distinguish us from them. Workers from plants and from the port also left with us. They were dressed in civilian clothes, even working clothes, although they had a gun and bag of cartridges.

"But after three days of fighting we had to retreat to Odessa; poorly armed and instructed, we could not cope with the torrent of interventionist troupes.

"In March 1918 in Odessa the Romanian Revolutionary Battalion received the command to evacuate to Feodosia. At the edge of the city of Yalta, M. Gh. Bujor gave us a revolutionary speech, encouraging us for the battle we were to begin.

"In Feodosia, where the president of the soviet came out to meet us, receiving us with bread and salt, we were quartered in buildings placed at our disposal by the city soviet. A little later, together with other soldiers from the Romanian Revolutionary Battalion, we received the order to board the ship "Social Revolution" with the destination of Novorossiysk. Here we unloaded the ship containing the entire wealth of our battalion, including munitions, food and so forth. Then we left from Novorossiysk by train to Moscow, where we were quartered in the Europa Hotel.

"When a group of trusty comrades were sought to fulfill a special mission, I also offered. Before leaving we were called to the Kremlin, where the great Lenin shook our hands, wished us success, telling us that he had every faith that we would fulfill this mission well, a mission as dangerous as it was important. We had to return to Feodosia and take some documents and money to Moscow.

"When we returned to Moscow with the mission completed, the comrades gave us a nice reception and told us that Comrade Lenin would receive us.

"We went to the Kremlin, where the great Lenin really did meet us; he shook hands with us and congratulated us, giving us a

'khorosho.'

"Shortly after fulfilling these difficult missions to aid the proletarian revolution in Russia, I returned to Romania."

Ion Ionescu: "In January 1918, several days after arriving in Odessa following the appeal by the local revolutionary organization, Romanian section, I went to the Romanian Revolutionary Battalion, where I joined.

" I took part in the street battles in Odessa and the battles fought in the surroundings against the White Guard and the German and Austrian interventionist armies. Then, under pressure from the Germans, who were much better armed than we were, we had to retreat with the ships to Feodosia, where we stayed until the end of March 1918.

"After this I returned to Romania and settled in Bucharest, where I continued to do propaganda work to popularize among our working people the successes obtained by the Russian people over exploitation through achievement of the socialist revolution."

Andrei Ion: "In 1919 I was in the city of Astrakhan, in a marine unit of the Red Army, which was part of the Baltic Sea Fleet.

"One evening, while aboard the ship Volga, we found ourselves with two barges of the Red Army loaded with two cavalry troops withdrawing from Petrovsk and Baku. These troops disembarked right next to our ship; then, in formation, they headed for rest at a fortress in Astrakhan. There also was one of our Romanian comrades in these troops. A week later we found this comrade, by the name of Nikita Teodor, on our ship; he told us that the soldiers of the two troops had been taken prisoners by the White Army led by General Markevich.

"When I heard this, I immediately went down on the pontoon and phoned the regiment. About two hours later approximately 80 marines came from the regiment; together with us, well armed, we headed for the fortress in the middle of the night, with Nikita Teodor as our guide.

"Here, at the gate of the fortress, we were asked to give the password. However, we threw several grenades forced the gates and entered the fortress. There were several victims at the gate of the fortress. Then, led by our commander, by the name of Gheorghe, we searched the whole fortress until we found the White Guard commander.

"Fearless, we and our commander entered the commander's office and shot General Markevich and several other White Guard officers. After this, all the White Guardists were arrested and imprisoned, while the soldiers from the two Red troops were freed. We installed our own guard posts in the fortress.

"A month and a half after this action, while our marine unit was on the bank of the Volga, the regiment announced that we should equip ourselves and leave for a monastery 18 kilometers from Astrakhan. We loaded about 40-50 marines in two cars and were at the monastery an hour later. It was surrounded rapidly and searched. It was guarded by one monk, who could give us no information. However, making a more detailed search, we found two rooms full of guns, machine guns, pistols, ammunition and other weapons. They all were loaded in the cars and taken to the unit. On the way we succeeded in catching the White Guardist whose job was to guard the weapons and we sent him to our regiment under escort.

"In 1920, when Soviet power was consolidated, I still was in Astrakhan. That summer, an uprising initiated and led by White Guardists broke out. Our unit received the order to reestablish order. For two days we took part in several terrible street battles in Astrakhan. The Whites were crushed in the last ones.

"Shortly after this action I returned to my village in Romania."

Ion Jurjac: "The news of the October Revolution even reached the settlements in the distant portion of Russia (the Far East, in Nikolsk-Usurisk).

"We went to the garrison, where all the prisoners from Nikolsk-Usurisk had gathered. I think there were about 4,000 people. Several communist agitators arrived here and said we should join the Red Guard. In the group of Romanians I joined and Ion Vasile, Trifonescu, Ilie Iulian, Stanila Forian and others. We were assigned to the company of Lithuanians commanded by Jakalini. The platoon commander was a Piotr, a locksmith for the railroad in Vladivostok, who had fled home several years before, having been sought by the police for communist activity.

"At the beginning our mission was to patrol the city in groups of 10 soldiers in order to supervise the circulation of trains arriving from Manchuria through the Gordekovo station, since Kalmikov's bands were sending officers dressed in civilian clothes to attack the organs of Soviet power. The city was small, with about 50,000 inhabitants, and I don't think the

number of all units exceeded 6,000 people.

"The much awaited departure order came in May of 1918. Later, at the beginning of June 1918, we received the order to embark, since we were being attacked from the rear. One night, counterrevolutionaries occupied the post office, telegraph and train station and destroyed the coastal batteries. Now they were coming toward Nikolsk-Usurisk to occupy the railroad junction, the only one through which we could retreat toward Amur. Thus, we remained isolated between two fronts without the possibility of taking ammunition and arms with us.

"Our embarkation in Gordekovo was done in a great hurry. The trains left one after another. In the last echelon were the Pioneers who had dynamited several railroad bridges to ensure our rear.

"After we had gone about 5 kilometers toward the mountains by foot, we spread out shooting as we progressed toward the objective indicated by the battalion commander. Finally, the much awaited moments had arrived. We were beginning the struggle against the counterrevolutionary army.

"Taking the numerical superiority of the enemy into account, we realized that the struggles would not be easy. When we arrived 15 kilometers from Nikolsk-Usurisk, our company, commanded by Jakalini, was on the left flank of the front, on a mountain. Having arrived about 40 meters from the top of the hill, we saw (the counterrevolutionaries) and opened fire. Their batteries were firing at our rear at short distances. In less than a minute the entire front was in a life-and-death battle. The explosions of shrapnel, the firing of the weapons and machine guns were producing a deafening noise. I had not even seen such a clenching of forces on the Gilitia front, where gigantic masses of soldiers were concentrated. We used our position, better on this side of the front, knowledgeably, causing heavy losses to the counterrevolutionary forces.

"By 1700 all the enemy machine guns facing our left flank had become silent.

"The battles were still in full swing at the right wing of the front and it was not possible to know which side would be victorious. Precisely when the commanders of the company and platoons which had escaped with their lives were deciding to send us to aid the right wing we were attacked from the rear. Occupying defensive positions behind the trees, we opened fire and then began the attack with bayonets and broke through the

ring of encirclement. Surprised by our counterattack, the counterrevolutionaries, despite their numerical superiority, fled in every direction.

"After things became more peaceful, I left for Vladivostok, where I took a job as an orderly at the city's hospital; in November 1920 I headed for Romania."

8071

CSO; 2700

ROMANIA

COMMITTEE FOR PRESS, PRINTING ABOLISHED BY DECREE

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 138, 26 Dec 77 p 4

[Council of State Decree on the Cessation of Activity by the Committee for Press and Printing]

[Text] The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1--On the date that the present decree goes into effect, the Committee for Press and Printing ceases its activity.

Article 2--The personnel of the Committee for Press and Printing who are transferred to other units are considered to be transferred in the interest of the job. Personnel transferred to other units in the interest of the job, to positions with lower levels of remuneration, as well as personnel who have become expendable as a result of the cessation of activity by the Committee, benefit from the rights stipulated in Article 21 of Decree No 162/1973 on the setting of uniform structural norms for economic units.

Article 3--The State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Technical-Material Supply and Control of the Management of Fixed Assets will propose modifications arising from the application of the present decree in respect to the indicators of the plan and the state budget for 1977 and in regard to the material base of the Committee for Press and Printing.

Article 4--Council of State Decree No 53/1975 on the establishment, organization and operation of the Committee for Press and Printing is abrogated.

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU,
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 24 December 1977

No 472

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

SCHEDULE FOR REMUNERATION INCREASES AMENDED

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 137, 24 Dec 77 p 1

[Council of State Decree on Re-Appportioning, by Branches and Activities, the Remuneration Increases Scheduled for Phase I 1978]

[Text] On the basis of the Decision of the Political Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party in regard to the re-apportionment of the schedule for increasing remunerations so that stage I of the increase will conclude on 1 June 1978, compared with 1 September 1978 as was initially stipulated, the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Sole article--Article 4 of Council of State Decree No 188/1977 on the application of the increasing of the remuneration of working cadres is amended as follows, in regard to the apportioning of the remuneration increases by branches and activities for stage I 1978:

Branch	Date of Increase
1. Petroleum, gas, methane gas extraction industry	1 I 1978
2. Geological work and drilling industry	1 I 1978
3. Transportation (including city transportation)	1 II 1978
4. Leather, fur, and shoe industry	1 II 1978
5. Glass, porcelain, and pottery industry	1 II 1978
6. Telecommunications	1 II 1978
7. Construction materials industry	1 III 1978
8. Electric power industry	1 III 1978
9. Printing industry	1 III 1978
10. Cellulose and paper industry	1 III 1978
11. Wood exploitation and processing industry	1 IV 1978
12. Silviculture	1 IV 1978
13. Local industry and activities of other branches of industry	1 V 1978
14. Health care, social welfare	1 V 1978
15. Administration, financial institutions	1 V 1978
16. Cooperative industry	1 VI 1978

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| 17. Communal economy, housing management and other non-productive services | 1 VI 1978 |
| 18. Circulation of goods | 1 VI 1978 |
| 19. Education, culture and art, the press, publishing houses, radio, the film industry | 1 VI 1978 |
| 20. Physical culture | 1 VI 1978 |
| 21. Unions, associations, and other activities which are not specified | 1 VI 1978 |

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 24 Dec 1977

No 477

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

REGULATIONS ON DIVORCE PROCEDURE AMENDED BY DECREE

Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 137, 24 Dec 77 p 2

[Council of State Decree Modifying Some Provisions Related to the Divorce Procedure]

[Text] With a view to simplifying the legal provisions related to the judicial procedure for divorce, the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania decree:

Article I--Articles 613, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 613¹, paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure are amended as follows:

1. Article 613, paragraphs 1 and 2 will have the following content:

"The chairman of the court, receiving the divorce request, will advise the plaintiff to seek a reconciliation and will set a date on which both spouses will come the council chamber.

On the date specified in the preceding paragraph, the chairman will try to reconcile the husband and wife. If the spouses do not achieve a reconciliation or the accused does not appear and the union has resulted in children which are minors, the chairman of the court will set a deliberation period of at least 3 months and no more than 6 months. At the end of this period, the chairman, at the request of the plaintiff, will subpoena the parties and, if they have not reconciled or if the accused does not appear, he will set a date for the hearing of the request. If there are no children from the marriage, the chairman of the court will set a date for issuing a judgement."

2. Article 613¹, paragraph 2, letter c) is abrogated,

Article II--Article III, paragraph 1 of Decree No 779/1966 on the modification of some legal provisions related to divorce, with subsequent modifications, is amended and will have the following content:

"The stamp tax for a request for divorce is from 2,000 to 4,000 lei and it is set by the chairman of the court in relation to the net monthly income of the plaintiff."

Article III--The deliberation periods set by the courts in divorce cases which are in the process of judgement at the time the decree goes into effect are reduced, or, on a case-to-case basis, eliminated, at the request of the plaintiff, in accordance with the provisions of the present decree.

Article IV--The provisions referring to the stamp taxes does not apply to actions initiated before the date of the present decree. Stamp taxes paid which exceed the amount set by the present decree are not refunded.

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU
President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

Bucharest, 24 December 1977

No 475

CSO: 2700

SWISS AID IN REBUILDING EARTHQUAKE-RAVAGED CITY

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 18 Dec 77 p 4

[AGERPRES article: "Zimnicea Is Reborn--The Inauguration of the Industrial Secondary School Constructed With the Support of the Swiss Government"]

[Excerpts] Through the untiring efforts of the party, the state, and the entire people, Zimnicea, a city almost completely destroyed by the 4 March earthquake, is being reborn out of the ruins. In its new picture, there is the modern industrial secondary school, specializing in metallurgy, built with the assistance of the Swiss government, which was commissioned on 17 December. In her speech on this occasion, Suzana Gadea, minister of education and instruction, said that the Romanian people, with Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu at the forefront, mobilized all their energies to eliminate the consequences of the earthquake as quickly as possible. Stating that during these difficult times, the Romanian people received friendly assistance from many states, the speaker expressed warm thanks to the Swiss government for the gesture of solidarity and the friendship demonstrated.

Dr Bill Arthur, division chief in the Federal Political Department in Switzerland, representative of the Swiss government for assistance abroad in the case of catastrophes, said that the Swiss people were very happy that the Romanian government accepted the offer of assistance, despite the fact that the Romanian government did not solicit the aid of the Swiss government.

The Swiss ambassador in Bucharest, Pierre-Henri Aubaret, praised the efforts of our people, led by the head of state, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, to reconstruct the entire country after the March earthquake.

CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

APPOINTMENT, REMOVAL OF OFFICIALS--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that: Comrade Mihai Diamandopol is released from his position as president of the Investment Bank; Comrade Gheorghe Popescu is relieved of his position as vice chairman of the Higher Court for Financial Control and appointed president of the Investment Bank; Comrade Gheorghe Crainiceanu is appointed vice chairman of the Administrative Council of the Romanian Bank of Foreign Trade; Comrade Maria Flucsa is appointed deputy minister of domestic trade; Comrade Constanta Balint is appointed state secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry--Department of the Food Industry; Comrade Dan Serbu is relieved of his position as state secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry--Department of State Agriculture; Comrade Gheorghe Ciolanescu is appointed state secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry--Department of State Agriculture. [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 135, 20 Dec 77 p 3]

NEW OFFICIAL IN BIHOR--Since one of the positions of deputy chairman of the executive committee of the people's council of Bihor County has become vacant, on the basis of Article 72 of Law No 57/1968 on the organization and operation of the peoples councils, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Stefan Szanto is delegated to fill the position of deputy chairman of the executive committee of the people's council of Bihor County. [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 135, 20 Dec 77 p 3]

OFFICIAL APPOINTMENT--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that Comrade Ion Stoichici is appointed deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee. [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 137, 24 Dec 77 p 3]

REMOVAL OF CHURCH OFFICIAL--On the basis of Article 21, paragraph 1 of Decree No 177/1948 on the general policy on religious cults, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that the recognition of Vasile Nicolae as bishop-vicar of the Diocese of Buzau is withdrawn as a result of his release from this position by the Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church. [Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 137, 24 Dec 77 p 4]

WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL--Israel is negotiating the sale to Romania of some missile-launching high-speed patrol boats and light weapons for the infantry. Bucharest, which wants to diversify its sources of supply, already has some Chinese high-speed patrol boats and some French helicopters. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 19 Dec 77 p 51]

CSO: 3100

OPSTINA DELEGATES FOUND ISOLATED FROM VOTERS, DECISIONS

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1399, 30 Oct 77
pp 13-15

[Article by Milan Milosevic]

[Text] When someone asked him how he spends his free time, delegate Radoje Ilic (NIN's [Nedeljne Informativne Novine] interlocutor) gave a truly sur-realist answer: "I read the materials." The way things are nowadays, the disciplined delegate would, as if he were preparing for a PhD dissertation defense, have to face serious disruptions in his family, work and sex cycles if he really wanted to master this multitude of mimeographed products of the administration, "professional services" and the political professionals (let us enrich the vocabulary with still another foreign expression, politocracy, which means rule by political professionals).

This may sound ironic, but one must admit that these plenipotentaries of ours are generally raising their hands in approval. Research done by the Institute for Political Sciences and Journalism of the College of Political Sciences in Zagreb shows that of the 4608 proposals, which were considered at the council meetings during 12 observed opstina meetings in the April 1974-January 1977 period, 4,606 were accepted. Two proposals were rejected. Identical research is being conducted by the Institutes in Belgrade and Ljubljana, and they will probably prove that this is not an unusual case.

In a first attempt to analyze these results, Ivan Grdesic gave two hypothetical answers in the journal "POLITICKA MISAO" [POLITICAL THOUGHT]. Either the delegates' cooperation had been secured during the previous phase of decision-making, and the proposal has been executed in such an expert fashion that the meeting vote was merely an expression of an agreement which had been reached beforehand, or it is something else.

"Something else" means that the professional services and the executive councils have a dominant influence in all the phases of decision-making. Because of the attitude "so what, everything has been decided already" and because the delegates do not have the support of those who have sent them to the meeting, a de facto blockade of the delegate system has been accomplished, along with the decisive influence of the proposers--i.e. the executive councils.

During the past few months, this diagnosis has been heard from certain very responsible people: It can be found in various shades in Kardelj's study of the political system and in many political public statements (we are noting just such a statement on the part of Budislav Soskic last week).

There is a certain reticence toward empirical research in our political polemic writings (a quip has already been coined--if someone strikes you with a fact, strike him back with functionalism.), so that perhaps it is risky to use the results of research which is not yet finished. Still and all, we will present certain impressions of these men who gaze into their computer printout sheets, with their numbers, correlations, and distilled data and will rely on the results of the preliminary research, conducted on a smaller sample, only because we are convinced that a real, serious discussion about the functioning of a political system cannot be conducted just on the basis of impressions.

Now then, in the preliminary research on the processes underlying the delegate decision-making in the opstina meetings, 63 decisions chosen as samples in five opstinas (three in Croatia and one each in Bosnia and Macedonia) were analyzed. On the basis of notes from the meetings during which the decisions were reached, it was established who participated actively in the decision-making, and it was asked from each active participant to name the persons who were also known to have participated. Thus, the conclusion was reached that each decision was discussed by an average of nine people. All the participants in decision-making were then asked to specify which phases of decision-making they participated in and to evaluate the influence of the individual subjects of the delegate system on the concrete decision-making.

What came out was plain as daylight: The delegates are almost exclusively "the carriers of the decision phase." As far as all the other phases during which the final decision was made are concerned, the delegates participate far less than others. "Judging from everything," writes Dr Ivan Siber, one of the researchers who analyzed the data, "the executive councils play the major role--from starting up the initiative to the very moment of the decision, when the prepared proposal is submitted for formal voting." There is no resistance to speak of: A perusal of the meeting notes reveals that a very small number of delegates say anything about the proposal.

When asked for a more precise commentary on these facts, Dr Siber stated, during an interview with NIN, that he thinks that one must not be too critical of the executive councils because sometimes ("or is it quite often?") the executive councils throw themselves into the void, confront the problems and somehow resolve them.

Is not this "filling of the void" really a prerequisite to have a small number of people "forced" to decide about everything?

Dr Siber cast a glance at his computer sheets and said: "It seems that one could talk about such a phenomenon, but it appears to be characteristic of the smaller opstinas."

"The indications point," said Dr Siber, "to the fact that in the smaller opstinas as many as 70 percent of those who hold managerial positions appear as involved candidates. The activity is, therefore, confined to a small circle of persons who will probably in 1978 (elections!) change their positions. In the highly developed opstinas this percentage of managers among the involved candidates drops to 25 percent."

"The weakness of existing practice," concludes Siber, "lies in the fact that those who are involved stick their noses into everything, while those who are not do not participate even where their most vital interests are at stake."

However, the researchers do not consider this state of affairs either critical or dramatic. People need time to adjust to the new process of decision-making. "You cannot introduce the system in 1974 and already in 1977 demand that everything should function flawlessly," says Siber, speaking of inertia in consciousness and inertia in political behavior. For example, analyzing the elections as a form of political involvement, Dr Siber notes that our elections, in a few crucial periods, were in reality a form of plebiscite which gave support to the basic directions of social development and also a certain kind of holiday (with flags, competition...). What is characteristic is the support given to management in 1948, the support given to the introduction of self-management, while the 1974 elections really were a plebiscite, acceptance of the new constitutional amendments. These critical social moments had an exceptional motivating force, but it is much more difficult to involve the people on an everyday basis, according to certain procedures, for certain meetings, through certain institutions.

There is an opinion which states that political activity comes only after certain basic needs of existence have been satisfied. Could this be one of the reasons for passivity?

"Our system is based on immediate interests. We must acknowledge the fact that not all people can be interested in everything, but everybody is interested in something. If, for example, 10 percent of the population of the local commune are present during a meeting where kindergartens are discussed, we can consider ourselves very fortunate if these are the 10 percent truly interested in kindergartens.

For example, the picture of the self-managing interest communes is typical. The councils of the providers of services function far better than the councils of the users of services. Why? Because the providers of services (health care, education, etc.) function as homogeneous interest groups because they realize their income through SIJZ the self-management interest

community. They are "confronted" by the council of the users of services, which is more heterogeneous: Take, for example, the "Koncar" delegation, which is supposed to be interested in health care problems. As an individual, each of them becomes interested in the development of health care only when he is confronted with his own illness, or the illness of a family member..." says Siber, wishing to demonstrate that on this side the definition of interest comes about more slowly. On top of everything else, those who are asking for money have another strategic advantage over those who are giving it: They can rely on their voluminous professional services to provide them with all the possible necessary and unnecessary reports.

How do some social problems ever get to the fore? Who has the initiative to start them up? Who says when they are to be solved? Past research gives a precise answer here. Of the proposals that are decided 45 percent are submitted by the executive council, 15 percent by the professional services and 9 percent by the professional institutions. In a word, "the professional structures" initiate 69 percent of the proposals while the delegate structures initiate 18.6 percent. It is interesting to note that the sociopolitical organizations are still not utilizing the right, granted by the Constitution, to influence the political decision-making. Instead, they seem to use the "old, time-tested methods."

The observations on the number of delegates who have consulted their delegate background during decision-making are also indicative: For example, only 23 percent of the delegates in the sociopolitical councils consult their own delegations, while 79 percent of the delegates in the regional councils do so, and 55 percent in the councils of associated labor. It must be pointed out that these figures were established on the basis of preliminary research.

NIN's second interlocutor, communications expert Dr Pavao Novosel, who is also participating in the analysis of the research results, emphasizes that the self-managing communication channels function very poorly: "We analyzed various delegate communications media and determined that the majority of their information is really useless: It is either so-called additional information, which is of no real value for self-management, or else it is too technical, so that the people cannot understand it."

It is characteristic of the famous "professional services" to refuse to give information concerning certain problems, says Pavao Novosel. The most frequent explanation is: "Please excuse us, but it is still not cleared up." It is not necessary to give the mandatory information, it is enough to say: We are of the opinion that such and such....

Expounding his theory of self-managing information as one which opens up a problem, stimulates thought and forms the basis for delegate decision-making, Novosel wittily says that the communications for the delegates are well written but useless.

Unfortunately, the picture does not look good; without an effective and alive connection with their background, confronted by the mystification and expertise of the professional structures, the delegates, by and large, [only] satisfy the quorum requirements. It was noticed in one opatina that the delegates were waiting before the meeting hall, so that if their presence was necessary to satisfy the quorum requirements they would enter; if the quorum was already satisfied they returned home.

Research will open up many questions of our political system. For instance, what value does the following information have? Of the 4608 decisions of the 12 opstinas under study, 3610 pertain to the opstinas themselves, while only 53 were forwarded to the republic and only seven to the federation. Does this mean that the delegates who have left for the "upper houses" are not receiving information from their bases?

However, one should not be too vicious about this, writes Ivan Grdesic: The establishment of the new system demanded a number of appointments, establishing of services, elections, verifications of mandates, definitions of activity, decisions on associations.... On the other hand, the greatest number of political proposals were considered during the latter part of 1974 and the early part of 1975--that is, during the period of establishment of the new system.

Only half of the activity of the councils pertained to the areas prescribed as their regular work by the Constitution and the law. Community politics accounted for 15 percent, economy-related decisions for 10 percent, etc. These data give cause to some optimism. One could assume that the delegate councils, after having suffered through the procedural problems, will establish a better relationship with their delegate base as far as the everyday life questions are concerned. Still and all, the system of the self-managing democracy cannot be merely an ideological slogan; it is the political foundation into which great social resources have been invested as well as a considerable amount of money, as if it were necessary to point this out also. While its groaning is not pleasant to the ear, it does not approach the volume of an alarm siren. Not only does the daily agenda speak for the fact that there is a serious political mood to perfect the system, but there is also the fact that considerable material resources have been earmarked for its study.

According to the results of the research, 45 percent of the delegations from the larger communes and as many as 63 percent of the delegations from the self-managing interest communes failed to bring forth even one question to the self-managing organs in the commune. On the other hand, as many as 74 percent of the delegates in the larger communes and 78 percent of the delegates in the self-managing interest communes received no proposals or suggestions on initiating certain questions that needed solving.

Who Carries the Initiative?

Executive Council	45
Professional Services	15
Delegate Base	15
Professional Institutions	9
Sociopolitical Organizations	6
SIZ	4
Commissions, Committees	3
Higher Structures of DPZ	
(sociopolitical communities	2
Council of Associated Labor	0.6

9110

CSO: 2800

YUGOSLAVIA

ROLE OF SOCIALIST ALLIANCE DISCUSSED ANEW

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1399, 30 Oct 77
pp 11-12

[Article by Stevan Niksic]

[Text] The most recent discussion about the Socialist Alliance, within the framework of preparations for the congresses, contains abundant critical tones. Why has this mass organization lost its mass nature, and from its former role as the front become merely the front of the leadership? Are ideological differences possible in the Socialist Alliance, and to what degree? Is there hidden resistance to Kardelj's book?

The indirect conclusion suggests that, apparently, Yugoslav society is once again at "the crossroads of the class struggle." Judging from the remarks made a few days ago by Vida Tomsic in Belgrade at the "round table" where the Socialist Alliance was being discussed--remarks based on her undeniably rich political experience--such discussions have become urgent in recent decades whenever such a crossroads was encountered.

Within the framework of political preparations for the coming LCY Congress begun by the 30th session of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee, a truly unusual and in many ways extremely interesting, and by its content far-reaching, discussion has begun precisely on that theme. Students of contemporary Yugoslav political history would say that the debates of Yugoslav communists about the forms of working among "the broad masses" have been going on for several decades. In practice, that has been unceasing. It is something of a curiosity that the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, the only organization to have emerged from the onetime Popular Front that was established throughout the world on the initiative of the Comintern, is still on the political scene today. The reason for that is simple, of course, as it is based less in tradition and more certainly in the Yugoslav form of revolutionary experience--self-management. Even in modern political circumstances, self-management has filled this form with a vital content.

The most recent round of debates on the Socialist Alliance, which includes last week's discussion in Belgrade, contain an abundance of sharply critical tones. Theoreticians and politicians who have taken part so far in the debates apparently have not tried very hard to express their opinions in implied forms, even for their numerous totally concrete remarks.

Responsibility for Shortcomings

If the truth be told this is not the first time that such things have been said about the Socialist Alliance. It could be said that for a long time the prevailing public attitude has been that this organization, which is defined in principle and constitutionally established as the assembly of all working people and citizens who are participating in the building of the self-management society, in practice remains far from the role assigned it.

In his most recent study of the political system, Edvard Kardelj has devoted considerable space and attention to the Socialist Alliance. According to some, he is the most critical precisely when he discusses that theme. The Socialist Alliance is accused of "parallelism" (doing the same functions as the League of Communists), of "sectarianism," "practicism," "verbalism," "forum work" and other things. Much of the responsibility for the shortcomings noticed in the Socialist Alliance are ascribed by Kardelj to communists, and he rebukes them for their "vacillating and inactive relationship toward the Socialist Alliance of the Working People and for underestimating its role."

From whence does this wave of dissatisfaction and criticism directed at the Socialist Alliance unexpected by many now come?

Dr Balsha Spadijer, one of the participants in the discussion, attempted to explain it by the universal logic of dialectics, asserting that the Socialist Alliance was lagging behind changes occurring in associated labor and in the political system. No one attempted to refute that. Nevertheless, it seems closer to the truth, since it is more precise in diagnosis, to agree with those who consider that we are witnessing an act of collective creative nervous energy required to overcome quickly the present state of affairs.

Eternal Floating

The fact sounds unbelievable that political science in Yugoslavia has yet to formulate a comprehensive, fully developed theory about such a mass organization as the Socialist Alliance. The dean of Yugoslav theorists in the area of political science, Professor Dr Jovan Djordjevic, considers that this provokes a whole series of contradictions and ambiguities in the political system. His considerably younger colleague, Dr Stipe Suvar, confirms this in his own way by stating that "we are eternally adrift when it comes to an actual determination of the role of the Socialist Alliance."

The mass organization has lost its massiveness and from the former front which emerged during and immediately after the war, there remains chiefly the front of leadership--in other words, the very thing that by its essence that organization certainly should not be. For Professor Radoslav Ratkovic, that represents a peculiar paradox. He asks himself how an organization with a vitality within it, with social energy emanating throughout political space, began to weaken precisely at the moment of the transition to self-management? Ratkovic further states that it is unclear how the Yugoslavs could have been less sectarian in earlier phases, when the position of socialist forces was less assured and less stable than today.

It would not be accurate to get the impression that only scholars and theoreticians are critical of the Socialist Alliance at this moment. Marjan Rozic, as well as most other participants in the debate, regards that precisely insufficient "breadth" and that which is called forum operations (not the work in a forum but work only in forums) affects the inefficiency and unsatisfactory public influence of the organization. Among other things, it is pointed out that no all-encompassing and more radical actions are under way to solve those fundamental problems. As one speaker noted: "It is not only that the Socialist Alliance is late; it is not even on the main battleground of the struggles that are taking place in society. Anyone can refute that assertion with a mass of resolutions, official positions, and initiatives, but it is hard to refute it with an analysis of actual practice." (Ljubisa Stankov from Zemba)

Man and the System

Those organizations, particularly in the local community and the commune, that theorize a great deal but do little, were on the carpet. Most often they discussed in general terms the building of a system which had already been built, or standards that have already been achieved. A system was being considered, but not man and life within that system. Therefore, their problems leaped forth from their desks, and not from life itself.

There was also talk of "political unity," for example in the communes, which is achieved by having five officials sit around a table and come to agreement. Yet they forgot in so doing that they had turned their backs on the delegates and the citizens. Thus there arose the logical question as to whether authority had moved into the politico-economic actives, in a place where it had no business to be. There they take positions ahead of discussion, make resolutions, and then merely pass them on for execution to their comrades.

One of those who sat at the round table spoke about the feeling of impotence of man before numerous institutions. He said, "I would like someone to refute this, but it seems to me that that feeling grows especially in the struggle for the everyday vital interests of the working people." Reiterating that self-management is a synonym for the socialization of politics, Dr Najdan Pasic concluded: "If from that standpoint we evaluate the characteristics of Yugoslav political life today, we will find sufficient cause and support for serious critical contemplation."

The impetus for such a relatively bitter warning directed at the entire society is found by Pasic in the statement that a significant segment of the working people and the citizenry is not involved in any type of socio-political activity. As Dr Ivo Margan stated: "The present production of extensive material objects is threatening to choke us, and meanwhile the public continues to be served at times realistic, at times impressionistic, at times elaborately copied problems."

The Right to a Different Opinion

It is clear that the present picture is in no way satisfactory, but how should it look?

For Edvard Kardelj, the Socialist Alliance is the broadest form of self-management of the working people and the citizens. From his studies of the political system, about which all the present discussions revolve within the framework of preparations for the congress, it could be said that he sees the key to solving the basic problem in the relationship between the Socialist Alliance and the League of Communists. Under the pressure of liberalism, it has become clear that the League of Communists must become actively involved in self-management. On the other hand, the experience of all clashes with dogmatism up to the present indicates that that involvement cannot be in the form of command, but must be battled through the use of argument.

After last week's debate in Belgrade, the true contours of Kardelj's vision of the Socialist Alliance stand out in much better relief as those of a mass organization which should express the "self-management pluralism" of the society. In contrast to the League of Communists (as a revolutionary alliance of like-minded individuals, thus presupposing a definite degree of party discipline and the principle of democratic centralism), an organization like the Socialist Alliance allows the possibility of respecting certain elements of political pluralism. Tolerance for ideological differences expressed in a democratic manner would represent, in Kardelj's opinion, a recognition of those realities which exist in Yugoslav society. One of the participants at the Belgrade conference "round table" expressed that in these words: "Someone may think this or that, but if he works to promote socialism, his working is more important than what he thinks."

It seems to be early yet for a definitive analysis of the current round of pre-congress discussions of this type, but it would not be out of place to present one impression, with the reservation that it, like any other superficial impression, can be deceptive. The 30th session of the LCY Central Committee, and especially the positions stated by Edvard Kardelj, which later appeared in his book, aroused the understandable attention of the public. Naturally, no one either did or apparently will attempt to oppose these positions openly. Still, one should not be blind and fail to see that despite the formal and declarative support given in individual discussions of this sort, the themes which they initiate simply remain on the

sidelines, or they are defended for their "actuality and sound basis," which is supposed to suggest a conclusion about a "book of nice wishes with an admixture of utopia."

If this impression finally turns out to be correct, will that not be just one more historical confirmation of the historical truth that the LCY, as in every earlier phase of the revolution, must take into account that the development of socialism and self-management does not occur spontaneously, of its own accord. To be actual (in the revolutionary sense of the word, of course) today as previously means to be prepared to enter bravely into battle for that which now seems to be distant and impossible.

12131

CSO: 2800

THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Nov 77 p 11

[Article by Dusan Bilandzic]

[Text] By the very fact that self-management is an essentially emancipatory process, it cannot avoid encompassing the national life. Yet it must be stressed that the nationality question under these conditions acquires a new dimension and perspective. For the bourgeois democratic level, it has become a free national state, and consequently has not become involved in social relationships, even though considering historical conditions, they were understood to be bourgeois socioeconomic conditions which would lead to the elimination of feudal particularism. Under conditions of the social emancipation of labor, however, which is the socialist essence of associated labor, the national question significantly outgrows the political plane and the restoration of a national state is only the prologue to national emancipation, which has the goal of creating a free national social community.

That is the reason why every nation in Yugoslav is vitally and actively interested in the development of the self-management society and its democratic formulation. Only associated labor, which by its intensity and its implementation surpasses the "political spirit" of the society, can create the positive conditions for a modern, socialist national community which will not become a slave to statism, the bourgeois democratic solution to the national question.

In such a context the national question receives its proper sense: in relation to the nation, it enables the realization of a socialist quality in the same way that that is accomplished, in respect to a class, by social emancipation. As a consequence, the national question becomes steadily less a matter of political calculation, or of international relationships, and becomes increasingly the historical realization of freedom by the process of socialist emancipation of labor.

The Historical Interests of the Working Class

The hegemony of the working class in the process of national emancipation which was never theoretically in question, now is acquiring a real position in the social order itself. The associated labor of self-managers is a concrete form of the historical interest of the working class as a whole in social relationships which vitally and in a lasting manner determine the fate and position of a nation as a community of working people.

In such conditions, nationalism is not possible in the positive sense; it is extinguished, and patriotism develops as the active involvement in the realization of the principles and relationships of associated labor in its own national community. In its traditionalistic significance and functioning, patriotism forces itself on the nation either as an absolute form of the political level of the national emancipation (the bourgeois position), or as a sentimental thralldom to the past (the petty bourgeois position).

Consequently, socialism as the democratic ordering of society on the basis of associated labor is the only path to complete and genuine national fulfillment, for which in earlier social orders and periods there were no conditions at all. That makes it possible for a nation in socialism to be constituted into a democratic community with a humane ideology of social progress and human freedom. The building of a new national consciousness and a national culture, which happily joins the positive heritage of its own progress with a humanistic universality of human freedom, is the natural fruit of such democratic development. That is the insistent demand of socialist thought for giving value and excess value to the national cultural heritage from positions of progress and the human and national fate.

By assuring the unhampered development of the national community, self-management socialism opens the true prospect for solidarity and communality of the Yugoslav peoples. Equality, which is the strong and authentic tradition of the Yugoslav revolution, is a process full of manifestations of the social and cultural life of the nation, and in that sense it is a historical process. Within there are intertwined, contradicting and bonded, various levels, accomplishments and potentialities of our peoples toward which history was not favorably inclined.

The primary realistic contribution that the system of associated labor can make to the idea and the actuality of the community and its solidarity is the humanistic quality and the socialist criterium of emancipation. It would be false, and indeed the problem of cooperation would have to be approached differently, and not from a class standpoint, were there not the proto-Slavic notion of the unity of the South Slavs. That which brings the Yugoslav peoples together and unites them is the principle of self-management socialism which opens a humane vista of freedom and progress to all Yugoslav peoples. That is the basis of real solidarity whose goal is to enable the less developed ones, to overcome their backward aspects, so that as soon as

possible the mutual development of all can be coordinated. Equality would be a naked word or a programmatic position if it were not to be realized in a real historical manner at the level of the socioeconomic, political and cultural life of individual peoples.

New Dimensions

Associated labor has given that a new dimension by reestablishing communications on an equal basis between the producers and making possible an organic way to solidarity, purged of parliamentary artifices and political deals. That is the idea of a unified market which, in Yugoslavia, has not yet acquired its full socialist quality, and in a number of circumstances that is more likely an obstacle than a contribution to solidarity. Yet it is a fact that the possibility has been provided and the economic and vital interest itself of the producers will be directed to make organic decisions outside of and against the political methodology of deals, which is still powerfully present. To the degree that such organic solidarity is realized in associated labor, to that extent will the political combinations be abolished and the relationships between peoples will become more natural and more free.

In addition to that, in Yugoslav conditions associated labor has made possible a significant counterbalance to the high level of centralization whose strong elements are still in operation, for both justified and unjustified reasons. That counterbalance is the institution of negotiation, a certain type of socialist "social contract" which assures the "natural rights" of the individual and of the nation. That could not be imagined without a fundamental mutuality of interests, bases and strengths which inspire and promote self-management development in Yugoslavia. With the conditions of associated labor, the national communities are forming in such a manner that their legitimacy in the overall Yugoslav community is expressed in the material and social interests of the community in question. In this the classical national political representation must lose in strength and importance to the benefit of the national representation of associated labor. And since the basis, interest and subject of associated labor in all national communities are fundamentally the same, the negotiation of agreements is not only possible but it is easier, with the presupposition, of course, that associated labor communicates on an equal basis, either without or with greatly reduced political mediation or official intervention. And when that takes place, everything will be subjected to the control of associated labor and its representatives.

That which still has not come to fruition in Yugoslavia cannot change the fact that the constitution of associated labor contains such a real possibility of negotiation and that it is within associated labor's subjective strengths to implement it. Therein lies the total complexity and moment of the struggle for the self-management constitution of Yugoslav society, which is clearly apparent.

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MACEDONIAN COMMENT ON BULGARIAN PROBLEMS

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[Article by Filip Simonovski]

[Text] What is the meaning of the Supreme Court statement that responsible officials in the state service have attempted to make their influence felt in court decisions?

Sofia, December: A commercial case which has already for some time aroused the press in Bulgaria is presently being seen on Sofia television, as the central theme in the most popular evening program. The camera shows all the actors in the so-called "million miracle,"--the chief financial controller who discovered speculations in a large Sofia firm; the former general director who, it is said, cost the state around 13 million leva, and finally the Sofia public prosecutor who characterized all this affair as "a case with great public danger." And yet the television audience, which does not let such programs go unnoticed because of the shocking data which they present, cannot fail to ask about the way in which all of these revelations came to light, even though it is said that despite the large amounts involved, the nature of the affair is very banal and does not deserve any special attention. The director operated badly--he thought, imported and stocked items that the market did not want, and with reserves accumulated in that manner, which now will have to be disposed of, he had an enormous deficit. Thus it was nothing spectacular, in that case was neither the first nor the largest. Previously speculations had been uncovered with much larger amounts of money involved, but they had never been presented before the television cameras, nor had they been the occasion for such serious treatment. The answer to these questions is offered by the director of the television program who, drowned out by the special sound effects of applause and shouts of "hurrah," solemnly declared that the previously mentioned director had received a new management position in another, even larger, firm.

This May State the Chief Reason

To be specific, for 2 years there has been open battle in Bulgaria against economic malpractice and all forms of deviation from socialist morality. Actions to "tighten all loose places" have been supported by authoritative declarations from the highest state officials and party leaders, who see the more rapid development of the country possible only with a return to "Leninist principles in life and work." In the given instance, some sort of discord has occurred, close to the ministerial level, since the director mentioned was not only able to avoid prosecution for himself, but also was able to obtain a new management position. Apparently in his case, "Leninist principles" had no weight at all, and there is where one should seek the explanation for the "shocking revelations" of the press. That truly "million miracle" is not the first instance where such a case has been used to remind certain circles of the oaths given at the July party plenum that in the future things will be done completely differently. Even today the press reminds its readers of the existence of so-called "petty capitalists," those people who, it is said, ride in black Volga automobiles, carry black attache cases, and pay private chauffeurs. As one of those chauffeurs stated in a declaration before an investigative agency, "My job was to drive him and his black briefcase around. Every morning I waited for him right in front of his door until he shaved and made his appearance. I considered him to be a petty capitalist."

It is becoming common to hear of private entrepreneurs who have wide connections with many economic directors and with their help succeed in sticking their fingers into the state till. Investigations which have been going on for 2 years, and whose activities as expected have been "terribly difficult and complicated," have so far discovered some 100 such cases. The end, however, is still not in sight, for the largest number of such people, whose black Volgas are still encountered today, must first be brought before investigative agencies.

"Why is that so," it is often asked, "and what hides the reasons why public intervention in some cases is so slow and ineffective?" Writers in Sofia remind us that "It is not easy to deal with those to steal 500 or 100 leva, but on the other hand we reward those others to do the same with sums in the millions. Is this a matter merely of 'terribly difficult investigation' or is some third element involved?"

Although nothing was said directly, allusions were very clear and anticipated the reaction that can be expected. "It is correct that there are people who want to interfere with the work of others," stated the vice president of the Bulgarian Supreme Court in a letter which he sent to the party newspaper RABOTNICHESKO DELO. They hold high public offices and responsible posts in the state bureaucracy, and in one way or another they attempt to influence the court's decisions. These people conduct their own private investigations and want the courts to accept their findings."

What is what and who is who in the examples which have provoked this public discussions would be hard to say at the moment. It is certain, however, that

neither the press, nor even more the television, would enter into such detail while referring to the July plenum, if they did not have sufficiently strong arguments and firm support. The impression left by this is not so important, for these incidents become interesting only as an illustration of an occurrence which is regarded as very serious and which takes on its final form in the statement of the Supreme Court's representative. From there also comes the public interest, whether the matter in question is millions of leva or "black Volgas."

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